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DECENTRALIZING THE AMENDMENT POWER
by
*
Jonathan L. Marshfield
The United States Constitution could soon be re-written by the states. Article V of the Constitution authorizes two-thirds of the state legislatures to
bypass Congress and demand a convention to initiate federal constitutional amendments addressing any number of issues. States have adopted resolutions calling for a convention to consider amendments that
would, among other things, require a balanced federal budget, eliminate
life tenure for Supreme Court Justices, constitutionalize universal
healthcare, and even invalidate bulwark rulings such as Roe v. Wade.
In April 2014, Michigan arguably became the thirty-fourth state to adopt
such a resolution, and convention supporters believe that a convention
should now be convened.
Although many observers believe that the current convention movement is
a political gimmick unlikely to succeed, Article V’s amendment procedures raise fundamental questions about how the amendment power
should be allocated between levels of government. Why should subnational units such as states, provinces, and regions have significant influence in the amendment of national constitutions? How do other countries allocate the amendment power between levels of government? What
are the likely risks and benefits that constitutional designers should consider when allocating the amendment power? Despite recent interest in
constitutional amendment rules, scholars have not fully addressed many
of these issues.
This Article presents findings and analysis from a comprehensive study
of decentralization in national constitutional amendment rules. It provides constitutional designers and scholars with a useable model for understanding how and why constitutional amendment rules might be
structured to include subnational units in the amendment process. Based
on an exhaustive review of the amendment rules in the approximately
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. I first
presented portions of this Article at a workshop at the 9th Congress of the
International Association of Constitutional Law. I am thankful for helpful comments
from the participants at that workshop, the Washington University Junior Faculty
Workshop, Dustin Buehler, William Foster, and my colleagues at the University of
Arkansas School of Law who participated in our 10-10-10 scholarly series. I am
grateful to Jordyn Sherman for excellent research assistance.
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191 extant national constitutions, the Article claims that there are currently five dominant decentralization mechanisms. The Article further
claims that although there are real risks associated with strong decentralization of the amendment power, there are several sound normative justifications for including subnational units in the amendment process. Finally, although one might expect decentralization of the amendment
power to correspond to lower amendment rates, the Article finds that
amendment rates in strongly decentralized systems are actually higher
than amendment rates in countries with centralized procedures.
In sum, this Article contributes to the study of comparative constitutional
design by providing a systematic approach to decentralization of the
amendment power.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution could soon be re-written by the
1
states. Article V of the Constitution authorizes two-thirds of the state legislatures to bypass Congress and demand a convention to initiate any
2
number of federal constitutional amendments. A convention could, for
3
example, approve amendments to require a balanced federal budget,
4
eliminate life tenure for Supreme Court Justices, constitutionalize uni5
6
versal healthcare, or even invalidate bulwark rulings such as Roe v. Wade.
A state-initiated convention of this magnitude is more than an academic
curiosity. In April 2014, Michigan arguably became the thirty-fourth state
7
to adopt an active resolution calling for a convention, and convention
8
supporters are demanding that a convention be convened.
1

See Albert R. Hunt, Push for Constitutional Convention Gathers Steam,
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-1130/constitutional-convention-gathers-some-steam
(“Rising
frustration
with
Washington and conservative electoral victories across much of the U.S. are feeding a
movement in favor of something America hasn’t done in 227 years: Hold a
convention to rewrite the Constitution.”).
2
See U.S. Const. art. V (stating that Congress “shall” call convention “on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several states”); Michael B.
Rappaport, The Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: An Originalist Analysis, 28
Const. Comment. 53, 59 (2012) (concluding that the “convention method allows the
nation to bypass Congress and propose amendments that constrain Congress’s
powers”).
3
Several states have called for a convention to adopt a balanced-budget
amendment. See Gerard N. Magliocca, State Calls for an Article-Five Convention:
Mobilization and Interpretation, 2009 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 74, 83; Michael Stokes
Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 764–89 (1993) (describing all convention resolutions
through 1993).
4
At least two states have adopted resolutions calling for a convention to address
this issue: Tennessee (1977, 1978) and Alabama (1981). See Paulsen, supra note 3, at
765, 784.
5
In 2012, the Hawaii Legislature adopted a resolution calling for a convention to
address “[a] declaration of the constitutionality of the federal Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, including the individual mandate requiring the purchase of
health insurance.” H.R. Con. Res. 114, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2012).
6
At least twenty states have adopted resolutions calling for a “pro-life”
convention. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 765–89.
7
The counting of state resolutions for a convention implicates myriad
unresolved legal issues such as whether states can rescind, whether a resolution
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Although there are good reasons to believe that the current conven9
tion movement is a political gimmick unlikely to succeed, the movement
has highlighted the extraordinary role that the states play in the amend10
ment of the United States Constitution. Not only can the states bypass
Congress and call a convention to adopt amendments, but a small minority of states can effectively veto amendments approved by a super-majority
11
of Congress. These procedures for amendment raise fundamental questions about how the amendment power should be allocated between levels of government. From a constitutional design perspective, why should
12
the states have so much influence in the national amendment process?
Perhaps, as some scholars have suggested, a better and more streamlined
13
approach would be to “simply eliminate the participation of the states.”
“Decentralizing” the amendment power—that is, giving subnational
14
units some authority in the process—is not uncommon in other nation-

remains valid if Congress itself proposes a related amendment, and whether state
resolutions can expire. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 681. Nevertheless, some observers
believe that Michigan’s March 2014 resolution was the thirty-fourth resolution. See
Stephen Dinan, Constitutional Conundrum: Michigan Demand for a Balanced Budget Could
Trigger Amendment Convention, Wash. Times (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/31/constitutional-conundrum-michigandemand-for-a-bal/print/ (interviewing legal scholars regarding Michigan’s
resolution).
8
See Stephen Dinan, Balanced Budget Convention Gains Steam as Congressman Calls
for Official Evaluation, Wash. Times (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2014/apr/1/balanced-budget-convention-gains-steam-congressman/
print/ (reporting on convention movement).
9
See Magliocca, supra note 3, at 75–76 (“[a]chieving reform through a new
convention is basically a fantasy . . . .”).
10
See Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 Const.
Comment. 107, 120–22 (1996) (describing states’ extraordinary power under Article
V).
11
Article V also provides for amendments approved by “two thirds of both
houses” in Congress and ratified by three-quarters of the states. See U.S. Const. art. V.
All successful amendments to the Constitution have been made using this process. See
John R. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed
Amendments, and Amending Issues 186 (2d ed. 2003). However, the states have
effectively “vetoed” six amendments that were approved by Congress. Id. at 183
(describing six failed amendments).
12
See Levinson, supra note 10, at 120–22 (“How can anyone seriously defend . . .
the present system that in essence allows one house of 13 states to block the desires of
the remaining public?”).
13
Id. at 120 (suggesting that one alternative to Article V is to allow “national
political institutions—either Congress alone or Congress plus President” to approve
amendments followed by national referendum).
14
Throughout this Article, “subnational units” refers to constitutionally
recognized and protected intermediate government units such as states, provinces,
districts, cantons, länder, etc. See infra Part III.A (describing and defending this
usage).
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15

al constitutions around the world. Some systems, such as Australia, Mexico, and Ethiopia, are similar to the United States in that they give subna16
tional units powerful veto rights on all proposed national amendments.
Other systems, such as South Africa and Austria, include subnational
17
units in only those amendments that affect subnational interests. Constitutional amendment rules in many other countries (including some
unitary, non-federal states) are also characterized by some form of decen18
tralization. Indeed, it appears that approximately one-third of all extant
national constitutions include subnational units in the national amend19
ment process in some way.
It is surprising, therefore, that there is very limited scholarship specifically investigating the role that subnational units play in the amend-

15
In its most general sense, “decentralization” simply refers to a constitutionally
protected “vertical” division of power between national and subnational government
institutions. See Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy 185–95 (1999). Some
political scientists ascribe a more specific meaning to the term that distinguishes it
from federalism. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of
America, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 37, 38 (2001). I use the term in the
more general sense.
16
See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 128 (all amendments must at least be approved
by majority in both houses of national legislature, approved by majority of voters in
national referendum, and approved by majority of voters within majority of states);
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Feb. 5, 1917, tit. 8,
art. 135 [hereinafter Const. of Mex.] (all amendments must at least be approved by
two-thirds majority in both houses of national legislature and by majority of state
legislatures); Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,
Aug. 21, 1995, ch. 11, art. 105 (all amendments must at least be approved by twothirds majority of joint session in national legislature and two-thirds of councils of
member states).
17
See Bundes-Verfassunggesetz [B-VG] May 1, 1945, art. 35, 45 [hereinafter
Const. of Austria] (amendments not affecting “competence of the Laender in
legislation or execution” can be amended by two-thirds majority of National Council,
but amendments affecting länder must also be approved by two-thirds majority in
Federal Council, which is comprised of representatives elected by länd legislatures); S.
Afr. Const., 1996 s 74 (amendments implicating provincial issues must be approved
by six of ten provinces).
18
See infra notes 187–192 and accompanying text (discussing decentralization of
amendment power in unitary states). Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution, for example,
declares that Afghanistan is a “unitary and indivisible state.” See Qanoon Asasi
Afghanistan Pashto, Jan. 26, 2004, ch. 1, art. 1 [hereinafter Const. of Afg.]. Its
amendment rules, however, provide a role for the provincial councils in the
amendment process. See id. ch. X, art. 149 (amendments require approval from
House of Elders comprised of representatives from provincial councils).
19
Of the approximately 191 extant national constitutions that I reviewed, 66 of
them contained amendment rules that secure at least some role for subnational units
in the amendment process. See infra Part III (describing my methodology and
findings).
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20

ment of national constitutions. This is particularly unfortunate because
amendment rules are arguably the most important provisions in any con21
stitution. Among other things, they establish the processes for changing
22
(or even eliminating) all other provisions, and they determine how con23
stitutional law will be entrenched. They also establish manageable pro24
cesses for popular involvement in constitutional change, and can oper25
ate as effective checks on government actors. Amendment rules are, in
26
many respects, at the core of constitutionalism. Thus, there is a real and
pressing need for rigorous investigation of constitutional amendment
rules. Constitutional designers and reformers need reliable analysis and
evidence to inform their design and modification of amendment pro27
cesses.

20

Indeed, I found only one unpublished inquiry, and it was limited to federal
systems. See Anne Twomey, The Involvement of Sub-National Entities in Direct and
Indirect Constitutional Amendment Within Federations (2007) (unpublished
manuscript), http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/workshop11greece07/workshop11/
Twomey.pdf. That paper notes that research was limited by unavailable English
translations of constitutions. Id. at 1. This problem has been largely alleviated by the
repository recently published by the Comparative Constitutions Project [hereinafter
CCP]. See Ed Finkel, Constitution Mining, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2014, at 11 (discussing
repository). The repository made it possible for me to review reliable English
translations of all existing national constitutions. See infra Part III.A (discussing
methodology). Additionally, my review was not limited to federal systems, which
resulted in my discovery that some expressly unitary states have decentralized
amendment processes. See infra notes 187–193.
21
Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1994) (describing amendment rules as having
“unsurpassed importance [because they] define the conditions under which all other
constitutional norms may be legally displaced”).
22
See Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 913, 913–14 (2014) (discussing function and importance of
amendment rules); Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment
Rules, in Comparative Constitutional Design 195, 195 (Tom Ginsburg ed. 2012).
23
See András Sajó, Limiting Government: An Introduction to
Constitutionalism 39–40 (1999) (explaining role of amendment rules in ensuring
that constitutions operate as higher law).
24
See Dixon & Holden, supra note 22, at 195.
25
See Albert, supra note 22, at 913–14.
26
Aside from their prominent function, amendment rules are increasingly
relevant because of the frequency with which they are used. See infra note 41
(discussing increasingly high amendment rates around the world). Despite anomalies
like the United States, constitutions are amended or replaced on average once every
five years. See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism
Revisited, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1641, 1674–75 (2014).
27
See Levinson, supra note 10, at 111 (“Anyone thinking about constitutional
design . . . must . . . address procedures for amendment.”); Albert, supra note 22, at
914 (“[C]onstitutional designers have few academic resources to explain how to
design the rules governing formal amendment . . . .”).
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This Article presents findings from a comprehensive study of decentralization in national constitutional amendment rules. From a theoretical perspective, the Article explores possible design rationales associated
with including subnational units in the amendment of national constitu28
tions. This discussion is important because it is not self-evident that
subnational units should have an independent voice in national amendment processes. Indeed, decentralization may create significant barriers
to necessary constitutional change and even produce wildly undemocrat29
ic amendment processes if subnational units have strong veto rights.
The Article claims that notwithstanding these risks, there are at least four
coherent justifications for decentralizing amendment power: (1) promoting constitutional legitimacy in political systems that are predicated, at
least in part, on the consent of subnational polities; (2) providing an additional “check” on national institutions vested with managing constitutional change; (3) protecting self-governance for subnational communi30
ties; and (4) enriching the quality of the constitutional debate. This list
is not intended to be exhaustive. Nor are these rationales mutually exclusive. They nevertheless provide a helpful starting point for understanding
why constitutional designers might divide the amendment power between vertical levels of government.
From an empirical perspective, the Article explores the various ways
that national constitutions actually decentralize the amendment power.
Existing scholarship generally considers decentralization of the amendment power to be a characteristic of formal federal systems where
amendment rules are structured to “safeguard” the federal arrangement

28

See infra Part II. This inquiry contributes to the growing literature addressing
comparative constitutional design. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Introduction, in
Comparative Constitutional Design, supra note 22, at 1–11 (describing
comparative constitutional design); Donald S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional
Design 1–25 (2006).
29
Both of these criticisms have been raised, for example, regarding the United
States Constitution. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 120–22 (suggesting that it might
make sense to “eliminat[e] the participation of the states”); infra notes 120–122 and
accompanying text (discussing controversial counter-majoritarian amendment
outcomes in Switzerland, Australia, and United States). Empirical research by
political scientists has shown that notwithstanding powerful extrinsic factors, a
constitution’s flexibility is affected by the number of veto players included in the
amendment process, which suggests that giving subnational units veto rights may
impact constitutional flexibility. See Bjørn Erik Rasch & Roger D. Congleton,
Amendment Procedures and Constitutional Stability, in Democratic Constitutional
Design and Public Policy 319, 327 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg
eds., 2006); Dixon & Holden, supra note 22, at 195–96 (“[S]uccessful constitutional
amendment may be more difficult in larger decision-making bodies, simply as a result
of the law of large numbers.”).
30
See infra Part II (explaining and defending these design rationales).
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31

by giving subnational units strong veto rights. However, my review of
amendment rules in every extant national constitution demonstrates that
systems actually decentralize the amendment power in various complex
32
and creative ways. The five dominant approaches (with many subtle and
interesting variations) are: (1) guaranteeing subnational units representation in the national legislature that is authorized to amend the constitution; either by creation of a separate “upper” chamber or by providing
subnational units with special representation in a unicameral legislature;
(2) requiring subnational communities or institutions to directly approve
amendments; (3) allowing subnational units to participate in amendments that address certain subjects; (4) guaranteeing subnational units
representation in special bodies convened to review proposed amend33
ments; and (5) allowing subnational units to initiate amendments. This
taxonomy is a significant contribution to the study of constitutional design because it highlights the creative ways that constitutional designers
can structure the amendment power to include subnational units in the
34
processes of constitutional change. The Article further aids constitutional designers by identifying common extrinsic factors that may undermine genuine subnational involvement in the amendment process,
such as strong national political parties, coordination problems between
subnational units, and electoral rules.
Finally, my review of amendment rules in all extant constitutions allows for some important preliminary observations regarding amendment
rates. A potential concern with including subnational units in national
amendment processes is that it might make constitutions too difficult to
amend. Indeed, the United States and Australia, which give subnational
35
units strong veto rights, have extremely low formal amendment rates.
31

See, e.g., Albert, supra note 22, at 957–60 (discussing how subnational units are
given power in amendment process to safeguard federalism); William S.
Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change 14 (1956) (“Most students of
federalism have agreed that a federation demands an amending procedure in which
the states as separate entities play a part.”).
32
See infra Part III.A (explaining basic data set and methodology for this review).
In short, I reviewed the amendment rules and related constitutional provisions for
the approximately 191 national constitutions that were in effect as of January 2014.
Appendix A lists the countries and the adoption years for all constitutions I reviewed.
33
See infra Part III.B (explaining and defending each category).
34
Others have noted that “[c]onstitutional designers must often be particularly
attentive to the vertical separation of powers between national and subnational
governments[,]” and that “constitutional designers should not discount” “the extent
to which formal amendment rules give voice and representation to subnational
states . . . .” Albert, supra note 22, at 960. However, until now, there has not been an
exhaustive study of the ways that amendment rules can “give voice” to subnational
units. This Article fills that void.
35
The United States Constitution has been formally amended only twenty-seven
times since its ratification in 1788. See Vile, supra note 11, at 331. The Australian
Constitution has been amended only six times since it was adopted in 1900. See 43rd

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2578091

LCB_19_4_Art_3_Marshfield (Do Not Delete)

2015]

4/17/2016 12:37 PM

DECENTRALIZING THE AMENDMENT POWER

971

Amendment procedures in these countries are often criticized as problematic because they do not allow for more regular constitutional change
36
through popular political processes. Recent comparative research has
also found that notwithstanding anomalies like the United States and
Australia, constitutions are more likely to fail if amendment procedures
37
do not allow for regular formal amendment. Thus, it is important that
any study regarding decentralization of the amendment power explores
how decentralization might correlate with available data regarding
amendment rates. My taxonomy of decentralization mechanisms provides an opportunity to do this. My analysis shows that, on average,
amendment rates in systems that require direct ratification by subnational units are higher than amendment rates in systems that do not decentralize the amendment power in any way. Additionally, average amendment rates are even higher in systems that include subnational units only
when proposed amendments concern subnational issues. These results
challenge current notions regarding amendment rules and constitutional
38
flexibility.
In sum, this Article contributes to the study of comparative constitutional design by providing a systematic approach to decentralization of
the amendment power. The Article has four major parts. Part I explains
the general theoretical background underlying amendment rules. Part II
explores the various design rationales that might justify decentralization
of the amendment power. Part III catalogues the ways that subnational
units have been included in national amendment processes based on my
review of all extant constitutional amendment rules. Part IV discusses
amendment rates in systems that decentralize the amendment power.
I. THE THEORY BEHIND FORMAL AMENDMENT RULES
Before exploring design rationales for decentralizing the amendment power, we must understand why constitutions have amendment
rules in the first place. This Part provides that necessary theoretical backParliament, Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia pt.
5 (2011), http://apo.org.au/node/27021 (providing official record of all
amendments and amendment attempts); see also Cheryl Saunders & Katy LeRoy,
Commonwealth of Australia, in Legislative, Executive and Judicial Governance in
Federal Countries 37, 40–41 (Katy Le Roy & Cheryl Saunders, eds., 2006)
(discussing relative difficulty of amending Australian constitution).
36
See Levinson, supra note 10, at 120–22 (criticizing Article V); Albert, supra note
22, at 972 (noting that Australia’s amendment rules make it difficult to amend).
37
See Zachary Elkins et al., The Endurance of National Constitutions 7–
11, 94–103 (2009); see infra notes 347–353 and accompanying text (describing
findings).
38
See infra Part IV (discussing significant limitations in using amendment rates to
measure relative constitutional flexibility and further describing my methodology and
findings).
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ground in four Sections. The first Section explains that amendment rules
were born from the practical realization that constitutions will, from time
to time, be under pressure to change and that there are meaningful benefits to institutionalizing incremental constitutional change. The second
Section explains that amendment rules often reflect (at least to a degree)
the source of political sovereignty in a society. The third Section explains
that all amendment rules reflect a determination as to the degree and
character of political deliberation that a society expects when making
changes to its fundamental law. The final Section explains that all
amendment rules must strike a balance between flexibility and entrenchment.
A. Practical Reasons for Institutionalizing Constitutional Change
From our current vantage point, after more than two centuries of
constitutional history, it may seem obvious that all constitutions need
39
rules for amendment. After all, every extant written national constitu40
tion contains express amendment procedures, and constitutional
amendment is an increasingly frequent part of political life in many
41
countries. However, from a theoretical perspective, it is not self-evident
42
that constitutions should contain procedures for their own amendment.
39

The “modern written constitution” was “first developed” by the North
American English colonies. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional
Amendment, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 355, 355 (1994).
40
Many early colonial charters and state constitutions omitted amendment
procedures. See Willi P. Adams, The First American Constitutions 139–40 (2001);
David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution,
1776–1995, at 20–41 (1996) (discussing amendment processes in early state
constitutions and colonial charters). The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776
contained the first explicit amendment procedure. See Lutz, supra note 39, at 356.
The use of formal amendment procedures subsequently “diffused” throughout the
world. Id. By 1978, more than 96% of all national constitutions contained
amendment procedures. See Henc van Maarseveen & Ger van der Tang, Written
Constitutions: A Computerized Comparative Study 80 (1978). All 194 extant
national constitutions contain procedures for amendment. Constitute Project,
https://www.
constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=amend (tagging all 194 constitutions as
containing an explicit “constitutional amendment procedure”).
41
See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 762, 806–07 (2012) (discussing relative frequency of
amendments). Although constitutions in countries such as Australia, Japan, and the
United States are rarely (if ever) amended, most countries amend their constitutions
regularly. Id. On average, national constitutions are replaced or amended once every
five years. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 26, at 25. This means that constitutional
amendment is a regular part of political life in many countries, and that amendments
are generating a significant corpus of constitutional law each year.
42
See Adams, supra note 40, at 136–37 (examining early constitutional theories of
John Locke and William Blackstone and explaining that they failed to develop basis
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At their core, written constitutions are intended to organize and limit government, and operate as effective pre-commitments that bind fu43
ture majorities to certain fundamental values. If constitutions are readily
amendable, however, they may cease to provide effective restraints on
44
government and popular majorities. It is not surprising, therefore, that
early constitutionalists wrestled with whether amendment rules were inimical to the very idea that government could be subject to a supreme
45
written law.
Perhaps the most provocative theorist in this regard was John
46
Locke. Locke believed that the supremacy of constitutional law required
that it be honored in perpetuity and any changes to constitutional law
47
required wholesale revolution. The 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolina, which Locke drafted, famously declared that “these fundamental constitutions . . . shall be and remain the sacred and unalterable form
48
and rule of government of Carolina forever.” Similarly, six of the original sixteen state constitutions did not contain any rules for amendment
49
or revision.
for amendment); Levinson, supra note 10, at 107 (describing hypothetical
constitution that forbids any amendments).
43
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy 96–101 (2001)
(describing constitutions in this way). But see Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before
You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1751,
1757–58 (2003) (critiquing some aspects of this description of constitutionalism).
44
See Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective, in
Comparative Constitutional Law 96, 103 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds.,
2011) (noting this concern and citing John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The
Amendment of Constitutions, 22 Law & Soc. Inquiry 501, 501–03 (1997)).
45
Indeed, early constitutionalists struggled with whether amendment rules could
ever be consistent with the concept of constitutional law as “set above the entire
government against which all other law is to be measured.” Gordon S. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787, at 260 (1969); see Sunstein, supra
note 43, at 96. (discussing this tension and noting that it was at the core of debate
between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison regarding frequency of constitutional
change).
46
See John R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American
Political Thought 1–17 (1992) (discussing various theorists’ views on
constitutional amendment and describing Locke’s theories).
47
See Adams, supra note 40, at 136 (describing Locke’s views on amendment); see
also John Locke, Second Treatise of Government §§ 89, 134, 149–58, 225–26 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690). There are more contemporary
proponents of unalterable constitutional values. See Carl Schmitt, Constitutional
Theory 150–52 (Jeffery Seitzer trans., Duke Univ. Press 2008) (1928) (arguing that
some constitutional values should be beyond amendment).
48
See Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Imperfection and Amendability, in Responding
to Imperfection 3, 4 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (quoting and discussing 1669
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina).
49
See G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions 62 (1998) (listing
early states without amendment rules).
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Although some early American constitutions did not contain explicit
rules for amendment, early American constitutionalists quickly identified
50
problems with Locke’s theoretical approach. For one thing, a perpetual
constitution presupposes the infallibility of its drafters. As Noah Webster
forcefully argued in 1787, proposals to fix constitutions in “perpetuity”
imply a “perfect wisdom and probity in the framers; which is both arro51
gant and impudent.” Although Webster ultimately rejected the idea that
52
written constitutions could provide effective restraints on government,
his critique highlights what contemporary constitutional theorist now ac53
cept as a basic premise underlying amendment rules. Namely, because
constitutions will most likely contain errors, they need some mechanism
54
for change to correct those errors when they are exposed.
Early American constitutionalists identified other reasons for constitutional amendment besides pure error correction. They recognized that
human knowledge regarding government and constitutionalism can
55
grow. Even under the best conditions, constitutional provisions can
56
have unanticipated consequences. Framers can miscalculate how provi57
sions will be applied or interpreted once a system is operationalized.

50

See Adams, supra note 40, at 137–44 (describing early American departures
from Locke’s theories).
51
Wood, supra note 45, at 379 (quoting Noah Webster).
52
Id. at 381–82 (quoting Webster) (“Unless the Legislature is the supreme
power, and invested with all the authority of the State, its acts are not laws, obligatory
upon the whole State.”).
53
See Levinson, supra note 48, at 3–4 (noting that Locke’s viewpoint represents
“conceit”). This viewpoint was expressed by George Mason at the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention in 1787: “The plan now formed will certainly be defective,
as the Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amendments therefore will be
necessary . . . .” 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 202–03
(Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter Farrand].
54
The First Amendment to the South African Constitution provides a
contemporary example of this. See S. Afr. Const., First Amendment Act of 1997
(including memorandum explaining that amendment was necessary because original
text included error regarding procedures for administering oath of office for Deputy
President).
55
See Lutz, supra note 28, at 151 (“Americans had long considered each
government institution and practice to be in the nature of an
experiment . . . . [P]rovision had to be made for altering institutions after experience
revealed their flaws and unintended consequences.”); Wood, supra note 45, at 614
(“Americans . . . believed [that] new knowledge about the nature of government
could be converted into concrete form . . . .”).
56
See Kyvig, supra note 40, at 37 (noting that Articles of Confederation required
revision because “constitutional thought and practice at the state and national level
had evolved in a very short time”).
57
See David E. Kyvig, Arranging for Amendment: Unintended Outcomes of
Constitutional Design, in Unintended Consequences of Constitutional
Amendment 9, 21 (David E. Kyvig ed., 2000) (“Experience with unforeseen flaws in
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They may also underestimate or overlook key environmental factors impacting a constitution’s efficacy. As constitutions are deployed, mankind
gains understanding about how they function and how environmental
conditions impact their effectiveness. Amendment rules provide a mechanism for societies to refine their constitutional arrangements based on
58
human progress in constitutional science.
Finally, constitutions may also need to be updated or adjusted because of changing social conditions such as technological developments,
59
economic fluctuations, and evolving norms. Early constitutionalists recognized that social conditions and attitudes can change in ways that require adjustments to a society’s fundamental law. As Webster again observed, “Unless the advocates for unalterable constitutions of
government, can prevent all changes in the wants, the inclinations, the
habits and the circumstances of people, they will find it difficult . . . to
60
prevent changes in government.” The far reach of the contemporary
administrative state and the extreme pace of contemporary social and
economic change further emphasize the need for mechanisms to ac61
commodate constitutional change. In today’s age, government institutions and social values can quickly become outdated, which creates the
62
need for constitutional change.
the Articles of Confederation reinforced the delegates’ beliefs that the new
constitution should provide for further amendment.”).
58
Madison believed that procedures for amendment of the United States
Constitution were necessary because “useful alterations will be suggested by
experience.” See The Federalist No. 43 at 284–85 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., Penguin 1987). The Twelfth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which was adopted primarily to address the development of strong national political
parties, provides a relevant example. See Akhil Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and
Death: Closing the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 215, 216 (1995)
(explaining that the Twelfth Amendment was adopted primarily to address the
impact of political parties on rules for electing President); Donald G. Stephenson, Jr.,
The Waite Court at the Bar of History, 81 Denv. U. L. Rev. 449, 464 (2003) (“[T]o take
account of the rise of the political parties, Jefferson promptly secured ratification of
the Twelfth Amendment . . . .”).
59
See Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 82 (Amendment procedures “allow[] the
constitution to adjust to the emergence of new social and political forces.”); Vile,
supra note 46, at 79 (quoting Justice Joseph Story) (“It is wise, therefore, in every
government, and especially in a republic, to provide means for altering, and
improving the fabric of government, as time and experience, or the new phases of
human affairs, may render proper . . . .”).
60
See Wood, supra note 45, at 377 (quoting Noah Webster).
61
See William E. Scheuerman, Constitutionalism in an Age of Speed, 19 Const.
Comment. 353, 355 (2002) (explaining that social changes present complexities for
constitutionalism).
62
See id. (quoting Richard Kay) (“‘[H]uman history tells us that sooner or later
every constitution will begin to chafe,’ and fundamental departures from an original
constitutional agreement inevitably occur.”). Constitutional amendments stemming
from the creation of the European Union are illustrative. See Tom Ginsburg & Eric A.
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However, the inevitability of change and human error does not nec63
essarily require that constitutions provide rules for amendment. Indeed,
John Locke, the most notable proponent of “unalterable” constitutions,
acknowledged that “things of this world are in so constant a flux that
64
nothing remains long in the same state.” Locke insisted, however, that
65
fundamental political change was justified only as wholesale revolution.
For Locke, changes to fundamental law could occur only when “those entrusted with the powers of government . . . disqualif[ied] themselves by
endangering the happiness of the community to such a degree that civil
66
society can be said to have reverted to a state of nature.” He rejected the
notion that there could be legitimate ad hoc changes to the fundamental
67
structure of government. Thus, Locke’s constitutionalism creates a zerosum game in regards to constitutional change: A society can change portions of its fundamental law only if it is willing to absorb the costs created
68
by undoing the acceptable and beneficial portions.
Against this backdrop, the advent of constitutional amendment rules
was a “radical” and “fundamental” breakthrough in constitutional theoPosner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1583, 1611–18 (2010) (describing
changes brought about by the European Union and significant constitutional reforms
that member states undertook as result); Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet, Assessing
the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, in A Europe of Rights: The Impact
of the ECHR on National Legal Systems 677, 686 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone
Sweet eds., 2008).
63
See Walter F. Murphy, Merlin’s Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once
and Future Polity, in Responding to Imperfection, supra note 48, at 163, 168
(“Acceptance of the necessity, even inevitability, of change tells us nothing about the
political desirability, the procedural propriety, or the substantive legitimacy of any
specific proposal for change.”).
64
Locke, supra note 47, § 157.
65
Id. §§ 149, 155; see Adams, supra note 40, at 136 (explaining Locke’s theory of
constitutional change and revolution). Locke recognized that changed social
conditions may require reapportionment of the legislature. See Locke, supra note 47,
§ 158. However, he believed that the executive could unilaterally make those changes.
Id.
66
Adams, supra note 40, at 136 (summarizing Locke’s theory of constitutional
change). Locke’s position was grounded, in part, in his belief that constitutional law
related only to the most basic structure of government. See, e.g., Locke, supra note 47,
§ 157. He claimed, for example, that the executive had the standing authority to
reapportion the legislature when it became “very unequal and disproportionate.” See
id.; Vile, supra note 46, at 11 (noting that Locke “commended executive remedies”
when certain changes to the legislature were necessary).
67
See Vile, supra note 46, at 11 (stating that Locke “would not have drawn a fine
line between constitutional amendment and the right of revolution”); Donald L.
Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to
Challenge Government Action, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 52, 58 (1985) (explaining that Locke
believed that there could not be major “alteration of the form of government without
political revolution”).
68
See Adams, supra note 40, at 141–42.
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69

ry. Amendment rules provided a mechanism for changing the fundamental “rules of government” without resorting to violence and without
70
abandoning existing constitutional law that is desirable and effective. It
was a persistent theme in early American constitutional thought that constitutional amendment processes could operate as an alternative to vio71
lent revolution and anarchy. Indeed, George Mason famously opened
the debate regarding constitutional amendment at the Philadelphia
Convention by stating that “[a]mendments . . . will be necessary, and it
will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional
72
way than trust to chance and violence.” Amendment rules solved a
pressing problem in early constitutional thought: They provided a means
for accommodating the inevitable need for constitutional change by, in
73
effect, “institutionaliz[ing] and legitimiz[ing] revolution.”
This development in constitutional theory is not purely a historical
anecdote. It continues to order the theoretical basis for amendment pro74
cesses. Amendment rules serve a variety of different important func75
tions, but their immediate function is to provide an ordered legal pro76
cess to manage necessary and inevitable constitutional change.
Significant for present purposes, this raises the question of why political
systems might fracture the amendment power and allocate it between national and subnational government.
B. Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment Processes
Another important theme in early constitutional thought was the relationship between constitutional amendment and sovereignty. Early
constitutionalists seemed to equate the authority to amend a constitution
77
with the authority to create a constitution. That is, they understood con-

69
Levinson, supra note 48, at 4; see Adams, supra note 40, at 136–42 (discussing
how American constitutional theory broke from thinking of the time regarding
supremacy and inalterability of constitutional law).
70
Levinson, supra note 48, at 4.
71
See Adams, supra note 40, at 138 (“The need for means of nonviolent change
was repeatedly mentioned in public debate.”); Wood, supra note 45, at 614
(“Americans had in fact institutionalized and legitimized revolution.”).
72
Farrand, supra note 53, at 202–03.
73
Wood, supra note 45, at 614.
74
See Levinson, supra note 48, at 4 (discussing theoretical issues involved in
studying constitutional amendment rules).
75
See Albert, supra note 22, at 913–14 (explaining that formal constitutional
amendment rules are “gatekeepers to the constitutional text,” “specify what is subject
to or immune from formal amendment, promote deliberation about constitutional
meaning,” and “express constitutional values”).
76
See Levinson, supra note 48, at 4.
77
See Wood, supra note 45, at 307 (quoting Samuel West as saying in 1776 that “it
is the major part of a community that have the sole right of establishing a constitution
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stitutional amendment to be an act of sovereignty indistinguishable from
78
the foundational act of creating a constitution. This theoretical approach to amendment presented early constitutionalists with design
problems. If amendment is an act of popular sovereignty, how is the will
79
of the people ascertained? Amendment procedures had to be practical
and implementable, but they also had to somehow capture the direct will
80
of the people.
Early state constitutions contained a variety of different procedures
designed to capture the will of “the people” by separating amendment
81
procedures from ordinary lawmaking representatives. The Maryland
Constitution of 1776, for example, could be amended only by acts of two
82
successive separately elected legislatures. The intervening election “ob83
viously was meant to function as a referendum on amendments.” The
84
Georgia Constitution solicited more direct popular involvement. It
could be amended only after a majority of voters petitioned the legisla85
ture to call a constitutional convention. These early amendment procedures were intended to operationalize the amendment power by separat-

and authorizing magistrates; and consequently it is only the major part of the
community that can claim the right of altering the constitution”).
78
Id. at 307–08. Constitutional amendment was frequently described as an
exclusive right of “the people” to adjust their fundamental law. Id. Additionally,
amendment was understood as an expression of popular sovereignty designed to
reduce agency costs and ensure the loyalty of representatives. See Adams, supra note
40, at 138. For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 created a “Council of
Censors” that was to periodically investigate violations of the Constitution by the
government. Wood, supra note 45, at 308 (describing this feature of the Pennsylvania
Constitution).
79
See Wood, supra note 45, at 307 (“But how was the will of the major part of the
community determined?”).
80
Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in
Responding to Imperfection supra note 48, at 89, 111 (explaining that early
American constitutionalists struggled to reconcile doctrine of popular sovereignty
with manageable processes for constitutional amendment).
81
See Adams, supra note 40, at 136–42 (discussing early attempts to design
amendment procedures and concluding that “[t]he point at issue clearly was the
relationship between the sovereign people and their elected rulers”).
82
See Wood, supra note 45, at 308 (describing Maryland’s amendment
procedure).
83
Adams, supra note 40, at 137–38 (discussing Maryland’s amendment
procedure).
84
See Wood, supra note 45, at 308 (describing Georgia’s amendment procedure).
85
Id. at 308–09 (describing all early amendment procedures). South Carolina’s
amendment procedure stands out in this regard because it permitted amendment by
a simple majority in both houses of the legislature. See Adams, supra note 40, at 140.
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ing it from ordinary lawmaking and providing opportunities for direct or
86
indirect popular ratification.
However, there is an anomaly inherent in the amendment power
87
that early constitutionalists underappreciated. As Stephen Holmes and
Cass Sunstein have observed, “The amending power is simultaneously
framing and framed, licensing and licensed, original and derived, supe88
rior and inferior to the constitution.” In other words, the amendment
power operates in a “twilight zone between authorizing and authorized
89
powers.” Amendment is an act of semi-restrained sovereignty that is different from the unrestrained power to create a constitution, but never90
theless superior to ordinary law-making authority.
This anomaly is important because it draws out the complicated relationship between constitutional amendment and sovereignty. Changes to
fundamental law necessarily implicate the source of sovereignty in any
91
society. However, amendment rules reflect a pre-commitment by the
92
sovereign to constrain its power to a stipulated process. In a democratic
society, this means that “the people” pre-commit themselves to making
93
constitutional changes pursuant to certain procedures. That precommitment limits the sovereign right of the people in that they agree to
not make ultra vires changes to the constitution, but it also provides a
practical mechanism for changing the constitution that carries the au94
thority of the sovereign to make fundamental law.
86

See Wood, supra note 45, at 309 (“These were beginnings, rudimentary efforts
to make effective the distinction between the fundamental principles of the
constitution and positive law.”).
87
See Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in
Eastern Europe, in Responding to Imperfection, supra note 48, at 275, 276 (“This . . .
alerts us to the undertheorized dilemma posed by the constitutionally regulated
power to revise constitutional regulations of power.”).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
See id. at 276–77 (discussing this issue further).
91
See id. In democratic societies, sovereignty ostensibly lies with the “people.” Id.
at 276. But, this does not fully explain the theoretical basis for the amendment power
or the reality of how many amendment rules are structured. See id. If the amendment
power is entirely derivative of the people’s sovereignty, why, for example, does Article
V not require ratification by some form of national referendum? See Levinson, supra
note 10, at 120 (raising this issue).
92
Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 276 (“It is almost as if the electorate,
through its residual right to initiate and ratify constitutional amendments, retains
some of its original authority to choose the nature of the political regime, to lay down
the ground rules of subsequent decision making, and to establish the limits and
legitimate aims of government action.”).
93
Id.
94
Id. This is why some democratic systems can legitimately amend their
constitutions without any form of public referendum. This is not because sovereignty
does not ultimately reside with the people. Rather, it is because the people pre-
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As explained below, the relationship between sovereignty and
amendment is crucial for understanding decentralization of the amend95
ment power. Many political systems, even democratic systems, have
complicated legitimacy matrices. Decentralized amendment processes
often reflect the complicated anatomy of sovereignty and political legitimacy in diverse and sometimes divided societies where subnational
groups receive collective recognition and protection.
C. Deliberation and Constitutional Decision Making
Early American constitutionalists believed in the “efficacy of a delib96
erative process.” More specifically, they believed that inclusive, rigorous
deliberation would result in collective decisions that better served the
97
common good. Even if one rejects this theory of collective decision98
making, all political decision-making processes exist somewhere on a
99
deliberative continuum. Some decisions are made expeditiously without
100
a slow and inclusive deliberative process. Other decisions are subjected
101
to more protracted and inclusive political deliberation.
Amendment rules are no exception. All amendment rules situate
constitutional amendment decisions somewhere on this deliberative con102
tinuum. Some amendment processes are onerous and highly inclucommitted themselves to making constitutional changes in a certain way, and they
delegated the amendment power to representatives subject to certain procedures. But
see Amar, supra note 80, at 90–92 (arguing that amendment rules, at least Article V,
cannot forbid popular amendment of a constitution).
95
See infra Part II.A (discussing how decentralization can facilitate legitimacy in
certain political systems).
96
Lutz, supra note 28, at 151.
97
Id.
98
Early American constitutionalists believed that “the more important the
decision, the more deliberative the [decision-making] process should be”. Id. Thus,
amendment decisions were generally subject to more deliberative processes. Id.
99
See John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in Designing Democratic
Institutions 75, 82 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000).
100
This was precisely Alexander Hamilton’s defense of a unitary federal
executive. The Federalist No. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987) (arguing that the executive should be characterized by “decision, activity,
secrecy, and dispatch” and asserting that these will generally “characterize the
proceedings of one man”); see Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the
Geneva Conventions?, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 97, 174 (2004) (explaining the case for
unitary executive in terms of immediate action without much deliberation).
101
This was precisely Alexander Hamilton’s argument for why a legislative body
should be numerous. The Federalist No. 70, supra note 100, at 402–08 (arguing that
a numerous legislature is “best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best
calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people”).
102
See Vile, supra note 46, at 79 (quoting John C. Calhoun as saying, “The great
principle to be sought is to make the [constitutional] changes practicable, but not
too easy; to secure due deliberation, and caution”). Although deliberation in
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103

sive. Those procedures often foster greater deliberation and consensus
104
amongst participants with diverse perspectives. For example, the Constitution of the Netherlands provides that amendments must be approved
by both chambers of the national legislature before and after an interven105
ing election. This process is designed to facilitate deliberation by (and
between) representatives and citizens regarding proposed amend106
ments. Other amendment procedures are rather streamlined and can
result in highly exclusive pro forma amendment proceedings. For example, in Nicaragua, the constitution can be amended by a single superma107
jority of the unicameral national legislature. This process likely facilitates a lesser degree of deliberation and inclusion than the process in the
Netherlands.
The important point is that amendment rules can embrace varying
108
degrees of deliberation and inclusion. As discussed below, this is significant for conceptualizing decentralization of the amendment power because including subnational groups in the amendment process may re109
flect a preference for more inclusive and deliberative processes.
Conversely, a centralized amendment process may reflect a preference
for consolidating the amendment power and limiting voices—especially
subnational voices—from the amendment process.
D. Balancing Flexibility and Entrenchment
Scholars and constitutionalists have long recognized that amendment rules must strike a delicate balance between flexibility and en-

constitutional amendment exists on a continuum, there seems to be general
agreement amongst theorists that constitutional amendment rules should strive for
deliberative processes. See Amar, supra note 80, at 110–11 (discussing the goal of
deliberation in amendment proceedings).
103
See Rasch & Congleton, supra note 29, at 331 (explaining that amendment
procedures in many Nordic countries are designed to create consensus by requiring
multiple decisions by multiple parties).
104
See Lutz, supra note 28, at 151–52; Rasch & Congleton, supra note 29, at 331
(“The degree of consensus can be increased through explicit supermajority
requirements within legislatures, or implicitly through other institutional means.”).
105
See Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Gw.][Constitution], ch.
8, art. 137–38.
106
See Rasch & Congleton, supra note 29, at 331 (discussing Netherland’s
amendment procedures as an example of a consensus-building process).
107
See Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua [Cn.], tit. X, ch. III,
art. 191–94 La Gaceta. Diario Oficial [L.G.] Jan. 18, 1987, Reforma Parcial a la
Constitución de la República de Nicaragua, L.G. Jan. 19, 2000.
108
See Amar, supra note 80, at 110–11 (explaining that “there remains
considerable room for flexibility in implementing the deliberation requirement”).
109
See infra Part II.D (discussing decentralization in the amendment process and
constitutional deliberation).
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110

trenchment. On the one hand, amendment rules must be reasonably
111
flexible so that constitutions can adapt to changed circumstances.
Dramatic technological developments, economic fluctuations, and
112
changes in social norms all put pressure on constitutional texts. Flexible amendment rules provide a mechanism for constitutions to prolong
their relevance and legitimacy by adapting to these fundamental and un113
anticipated changes.
On the other hand, constitutions must be relatively rigid and en114
trenched or they cease to provide real limitations on political power. By
definition, constitutions are intended to restrain government officials
115
and protect minorities from majoritarian abuses. Constitutions precommit society to a basic civil structure in order to promote predictability, fairness, and stability. To do this effectively, however, constitutions

110

See Ferejohn, supra note 44, at 502–03.
Id.; see Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 81 (“Given the existence of exogenous
shocks that change the costs and benefits to the parties to a constitutional bargain,
constitutions require mechanisms for adjustment over time.”); The Federalist No.
85, at 484–86 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (discussing the need
for mechanisms to correct unintended consequences).
112
See Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 81–83.
113
It is well recognized that constitutional change can occur through formal
amendment of the constitutional text or “informal” changes in constitutional norms.
See Nathalie Behnke & Arthur Benz, The Politics of Constitutional Change between Reform
and Evolution, 39 Publius 213, 217 (2009) (explaining implicit constitutional change
as any extra-textual shift in constitutional norms). Informal changes often occur
through judicial interpretation of constitutional texts. See Lutz, supra note 39, at 357–
58 (explaining that constitutional change is necessary in any system, and if
amendment procedures are arduous, change will likely occur through judicial
review). It is nevertheless appropriate to study formal constitutional amendment
independent of informal amendment for several reasons. See Richard Simeon,
Constitutional Design and Change in Federal Systems: Issues and Questions, 39 Publius 241,
241–42 (2009). Formal constitutional amendment is usually an overt act. This means
that the costs and benefits of explicit constitutional amendment are different from
implicit amendment, which can be subtle and insulated from direct popular
approval. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional
Amendments: A Response to David Strauss, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 247, 274 (2002) (discussing
this point in relation to amendment of the U.S. Constitution). Consequently, formal
amendments provide a clear picture of the sort of constitutional changes a society
intentionally and directly selects. Additionally, from a comparative constitutional
perspective, there is evidence that constitutional change increasingly occurs through
formal amendment, which makes the study of amendment procedures timely. See
supra note 26 (discussing increased frequency of constitutional amendment).
114
See Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 76–78; Ferejohn, supra note 44, at 502–03.
115
See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 3–5 (1991) (“[A]
written constitution is like a trust agreement. It specifies what powers the trustees are
to have and it endows these agents with certain authority delegated by the settler who
created the trust.”).
111
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must be changeable only by special and more arduous procedures.
117
Otherwise, they cease to provide meaningful limits on political power.
In other words, constitutions must be flexible enough to accommodate the inevitable pressure to change, but they must not be so flexible
that they cease to operate as higher law that effectively restrains society
118
and government. Thus, any discussion regarding the allocation of the
amendment power must be sensitive to how design proposals will affect a
constitution’s flexibility. This is especially true for design proposals related to decentralization, which may include adding new parties to the deci119
sion-making process.
II. DESIGN RATIONALES FOR DECENTRALIZING THE
AMENDMENT POWER
In view of the above theoretical framework, it is not self-evident that
subnational units should have significant influence in national amendment processes. Indeed, there are real risks associated with decentralizing the amendment power. For one thing, adding parties to the amendment process may make necessary constitutional change more difficult
because, in general, as the number of parties to a constitutional decision
increases, the number of choices that the entire group will accept de120
creases. Thus, approval of a constitutional amendment is less likely in a
system that requires subnational units to ratify amendments in addition
121
to other national institutions. Moreover, if subnational units are given
significant minority veto rights, they may be able to exert disproportion116

See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A
Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 Va. L. Rev. 385, 418–29 (2003) (discussing
purposes of entrenchment). Constitutionalism is necessarily connected with the rule
of law, which requires that government itself be subject to law. The entrenchment
and supremacy of constitutional law is designed to realize this ideal. See Harvey
Wheeler, The Foundations of Constitutionalism, 8 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 507, 508 (1975).
117
See Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 82 (“To be sure, if taken to an extreme,
flexibility undermines the very notion of constitutionalism as a set of stable limits on
ordinary politics.”).
118
See id. (“If a constitution is completely flexible, as in the model of
parliamentary sovereignty, it may not be able to provide enduring rules that bind the
polity together.”).
119
See Dixon & Holden, supra note 22, at 196–99 (discussing how constitutional
amendment becomes more difficult as more decision-makers are added).
120
See id.
121
This is by no means a settled conclusion amongst political scientists. See id. at
195–210 (testing and confirming a version of this premise); Ferejohn, supra note 44,
at 522–23 (analyzing data from thirty constitutional republics and finding no
evidence that a requirement for ratification by subnational units increases
amendment rates). It is nevertheless a real risk facing constitutional designers and it
is supported by theoretical and empirical constitutional scholarship. See Rasch &
Congleton, supra note 29, at 319 (discussing theory and empirical testing).
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ate power over the amendment process, which could undermine a consti122
tution’s popular legitimacy.
In light of the real risks associated with decentralizing the amendment power, it is important to investigate any countervailing rationales
that might nevertheless justify decentralization. Understanding these design rationales does not resolve the risks associated with decentralization,
but it may explain why some systems accept those risks, and, more importantly, it may help constitutional designers craft amendment rules
suitable to their circumstances. This Part argues that there are at least
four sound rationales for including subnational units in national
123
amendment processes.

122

A basic theoretical problem in constitutionalism is how to justify, from a
democratic perspective, the reality that constitutions permit past majorities to dictate
the choices of current majorities. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 98–113 (2d ed.
1986) (providing a classic discussion of this issue). Decentralizing the amendment
power in constitutional democracies can sometimes accentuate this “countermajoritarian” problem by allowing a small segment of the national population to
block constitutional amendments supported by the rest of the population. See
Livingston, supra note 31, at 312–13 (discussing this issue in federal systems);
Levinson, supra note 10, at 120 (discussing the potential legitimacy problems created
by Article V’s amendment procedures). In Australia, for example, there have been six
instances where constitutional amendments failed even though they were approved
by a majority in both houses of the national legislature and a majority of voters in a
national referendum. See Parliamentary Handbook, supra note 35, at 385. Those
amendments failed solely because Australia’s constitution requires amendments to be
ratified by a majority of voters in a majority of the Australian states. See AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTION s 128 (constitutional amendment rules); Livingston, supra note 31, at
124–28 (discussing three of these failed amendments). There are other examples of
failed amendments like this in Switzerland, the United States, and Canada. See
Livingston, supra note 31, at 312–13 (discussing a failed amendment in Switzerland
that received a majority in national referendum but failed to be ratified by a majority
of cantons); id. at 234 (discussing failed amendments in United States that were
approved by Congress and ratified by a majority of states that comprised a majority of
the national population); Peter Oliver, Canada, Quebec, and Constitutional Amendment,
49 Univ. Toronto L.J. 519, 591–92 (1999) (discussing failed Meech Lake Accord
amendments that were approved twice by the national House of Commons and by
eight of ten provincial legislatures (representing over 93% of the national
population) but nevertheless failed because two small provinces did not support
them).
123
This is not intended to be an exhaustive list. Moreover, amendment rules in
any particular system may be the product of various design strategies and extrinsic
environmental factors. Thus, this Part does not claim to fully describe any particular
system. Rather, this Part seeks to systematize the possible justifications for
decentralizing amendment power and draw upon helpful anecdotal illustrations.
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A. Political Legitimacy and Decentralizing the Amendment Power
Under certain conditions, decentralizing the amendment power may
help promote or maintain constitutional legitimacy. For example, many
federal states are predicated, at least in part, on a joining or union of pre124
existing political units. In those states, the national constitution represents an agreement between political communities regarding the terms
125
of the federal union. The legitimacy of the national constitution arises,
in part, from the consent of the subnational communities that created
126
it. Many early scholars of federalism therefore concluded that “federalism . . . demands an amending procedure in which the states as separate
127
entities play a part.” On this theory, national constitutional change can
occur “only with the consent of the component units” because their con128
sent is necessary to legitimize the new conditions of the federal union.
Thus, it is important that amendment rules provide a mechanism for
129
“eliciting” that consent from subnational units.
The Articles of Confederation are illustrative. Under the Articles, the
thirteen original states joined together to create a confederation of inde130
pendent states. The Articles were predicated on the sovereignty of the
states and not the sovereignty of the people as a consolidated national
131
community. The central government’s legitimacy was derived entirely
from the compacting of the thirteen original states, which retained their

124
See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Facets of Federalism, 38 Am. J.
Comp. L. 205, 206 (1990) (describing sources of legitimacy in both “integrative” and
“devolutionary” federal systems and analyzing various political forces in federal
systems that provide legitimacy to the national constitution).
125
See James A. Gardner, Interpreting State Constitutions 59 (2005)
(discussing the connection between this model of constitutionalism and Lockean
political theory); see Lenaerts, supra note 124, at 205–06.
126
See Lenaerts, supra note 124, at 206 (“The goal of establishing an effective
central government with direct operation on the people inside its sphere of powers is
pursued under respect of the powers of the component entities.”).
127
Livingston, supra note 31, at 14 (citing James Bryce, Studies in History
and Jurisprudence 173 (1901); Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government
and Democracy 209 (1937)).
128
Livingston, supra note 31, at 298.
129
Id. at 299–300.
130
See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1446
(1987) (explaining that the framers of the Articles of Confederation had in mind “an
association of states . . . that could coordinate joint action by its ‘sovereign’
members”); Richard B. Bernstein with Jerome Agel, Amending America 10–11
(1993) (same).
131
See Amar, supra note 130, at 1449 (“[T]he heart of the issue was sovereignty.
The Articles [of Confederation] . . . [were] . . . erected on the uneven and shifting
foundation of the sovereignty of the People in each state.”).
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132

independence and sovereignty. Indeed, the central government did
not have jurisdiction over individual citizens, but was dependent on the
133
states to enforce any national policies. The amendment procedures in
134
the Articles of Confederation reflected this “compact theory” of legitimacy because they required all amendments to be approved by every
135
state. In other words, the amendment rules reflected an extreme decentralization of the amendment power that was consistent with the
136
source of sovereignty in that system.
Tanzania’s current constitution provides a contemporary example.
Tanzania is effectively a union between the east African country of Tan137
ganyika and Zanzibar, a small archipelago off the coast of Tanganyika.
Tanzania’s amendment rules reflect this because although Zanzibar is
much smaller than Tanganyika, Zanzibari representatives participate in
138
all proposed amendments. Additionally, any amendments to the constitution that would affect Zanzibar’s status or jurisdiction must be approved by two-thirds of Zanzibar’s representatives in the unicameral Na139
tional Assembly.
Although this structure might deeply entrench
provisions related to Zanzibar, it presumably provides stability to the sys140
tem by protecting Zanzibar from abuses by Tanganyika. In this way, the
Tanzanian Constitution protects the original constitutional bargain be-

132

As Amar explains, the Articles of Confederation were more akin to a multilateral treaty between independent countries than a national constitution. See id. at
1446–47.
133
Id. at 1446 (“Such a federation would in no sense be an internal government
exercising sovereign coercive powers over individuals.”); see Bernstein & Agel, supra
note 130, at 10 (stating that under the Articles of Confederation, the national
government had “no power to operate directly on individual citizens”).
134
See Amar, supra note 130, at 1464.
135
See Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. XIII; see also Bernstein & Agel,
supra note 130, at 11 (quoting and discussing Article XIII of Articles of
Confederation).
136
See Bernstein & Agel, supra note 130, at 11 (concluding that because each
State understood itself to be an independent sovereign, “[i]t was natural that so farreaching an act as amending the Articles should require the consent of all members
of the Confederation”).
137
See S.G. Ayany, A History of Zanzibar 138–47 (1970) (describing the
creation of Tanzania and the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar and including
copies of founding documents). There has been a strong movement to consolidate
power in Tanzania and create a unified national republic.
138
See Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, April 25, 1977, ch.
3, pt. 3, § 98 and Second Schedule [hereinafter Const. of Tanz.].
139
Id.
140
But see Festo Maro & Joseph Ibreck, Petroleum Policy and Constitutional Paradox
in the United Republic of Tanzania, Econ. & Soc. Res. Found., (TAKNET Policy Brief
Series, Nov. 5, 2009) (discussing Zanzibar’s newfound wealth from offshore oil and
how this change has caused Zanzibar to destabilize the constitution because it wants
to renegotiate more favorable terms).
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tween Zanzibar and Tanganyika by decentralizing the amendment power.
Notwithstanding these examples, sovereignty and political legitimacy
are often more complicated than a simple compact between constituent
141
units. The Constitution of Switzerland, for example, is the only extant
constitution that expressly identifies itself as a “confederation,” which
might suggest that it is primarily a union of its constituent units (the Can142
tons). However, the Swiss Constitution further provides that the “Confederation” is formed by the “Swiss People” and the “Cantons,” which
suggests that legitimacy derives from both the national population as a
143
whole and the Cantons. Indeed, Switzerland’s amendment rules reflect
this because they require ratification by both national popular referen144
dum and the Cantons. Other countries, such as South Africa, have constitutionalized subnational government but expressly rejected the notion
that their national constitutions are based on the union of pre-existing
145
political communities. South Africa’s amendment rules nevertheless
include provincial representatives in all amendments that affect provin146
cial interests. This division of power in South Africa was primarily the
result of an important power-sharing compromise that was designed to
147
protect certain subnational groups.

141

See Amar, supra note 130, at 1450–66 (discussing many complexities associated
with “locating” sovereignty in the United States after the Federal Constitution was
adopted); Lenaerts, supra note 124, at 206–20 (discussing the complexities of
sovereignty in federal systems).
142
See Bundesverfassung [BV] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 1, [hereinafter Const.
of Switz.]. The data from the CCP shows that no other extant national constitution
identifies itself as “confederal.” See infra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing
CPP data).
143
The Swiss Constitution provides: “The People and the Cantons . . . form the
Swiss Confederation.” Const. of Switz., SR 101, art. 1; see Lenaerts, supra note 124, at
233–37(discussing history and nature of Switzerland’s political arrangement; albeit
before Switzerland’s updated constitution was adopted in 1999); see also Walter
Haller, The New Swiss Constitution: Foreign and International Influences, 30 Int’l J. Legal
Info. 256, 256 (2002) (concluding that although “Switzerland has a brand-new
Federal Constitution . . . the main features of our constitutional order—a federal
state . . . go back to 1848”).
144
See Const. of Switz., SR 101, art. 140.
145
Indeed, section 1 of South Africa’s Constitution declares that “[t]he Republic
of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state.” S. Afr. Const., 1996 s 1; see In re
Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal 1996 (11) SA 1098 (CC)
at para. 14 (S. Afr.) (“[T]he provinces are the recipients and not the source of
power.”).
146
See S. Afr. Const., 1996 s 44 (describing procedures for amending South
Africa’s constitution).
147
See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Authorizing Subnational Constitutions in Transitional
Federal States: South Africa, Democracy, and the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, 41 Vand. J.
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These latter examples highlight that constitutional legitimacy sometimes derives from a combination of the national community as well as
subnational units. Constitutional designers may need to be sensitive to
this when designing amendment rules. If political legitimacy in a society
requires recognition and voice for certain subnational units or communities, it will be important to consider whether those groups should be in148
cluded in the amendment process to some degree. Conversely, if political legitimacy derives in part from the national community as a whole,
amendment rules may need to include mechanisms that elicit approval
from the national community. Legitimacy matrices are complicated in
any society, but the general design point here is that promoting or maintaining constitutional legitimacy can be a legitimate reason for decentralizing the amendment power.
B. Checks-and-Balances and Constitutional Outputs
Another reason to decentralize the amendment power may be to
promote checks-and-balances in the amendment process and in govern149
ment in general. A generic objective for decentralizing government au150
thority is to protect against government abuse. In many systems, subnational government exists, in part, to provide a “check” on national
151
institutions. By dividing government power between national and subnational institutions, it is hoped that both levels of government have incentives to monitor each other, which can prevent government abuses
152
and protect liberty. This was Madison’s well-known justification for
153
American federalism.
Transnat’l L. 585, 602–21 (2008) (discussing details of this compromise and its
significance for South Africa’s political structure).
148
See Albert, supra note 22, at 960 (noting that this consideration may be greater
during times of constitutional transition).
149
See Dixon & Holden, supra note 22, at 97 (noting that the general function of
constitutional amendment rules is to provide checks on informal constitutional
change).
150
See Gardner, supra note 125, at 80–143 (describing this role of federalism in
United States); James A. Gardner & Antoni Abad Ininet, Sustainable Decentralization:
Power, Extraconstitutional Influence, and Subnational Symmetry in the United States and
Spain, 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 491, 494–96 (2011) (defining “contestatory federalism” as “a
conception of divided power that justifies federalism as a method of protecting liberty
through the institutionalization of a permanent contest for power between national
and subnational units of government”).
151
See Gardner & Ininet, supra note 150, at 494.
152
Id.
153
See The Federalist No. 46, at 298–302 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987); The Federalist No. 47, at 302–08 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987); The Federalist No. 51, at 320–21 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987); Gardner & Ininet, supra note 150, at 494 (“‘The accumulation of all powers . . .
in the same hands,’ wrote Madison in Federalist No. 47, ‘may justly be pronounced the
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This design logic is relevant to amendment rules in at least two ways.
First, the general checks-and-balances system in government fails if national institutions can unilaterally amend the national constitution to circumvent (or eliminate) subnational government. Under those conditions, national government would have less incentive to respect
subnational government, and subnational government would have less
incentive to challenge national government. Although entrenchment of
constitutional provisions provides some protection for subnational government, a stronger protection is to include subnational government in
the amendment process. If subnational government is included, it can
more confidently challenge national action without fear of a unilateral
constitutional response by the national government. Thus, some constitutions might decentralize the amendment power as a way to protect the
154
overall allocation of government authority.
Madison’s checks-and-balances logic is also relevant to amendment
rules in another way. The amendment power, like any government power, can be misused, especially if it is consolidated in one person or insti155
tution. Thus, it makes sense to build checks-and-balances into the
amendment power itself. If the amendment power contains its own
checks-and-balances, it is less likely to be misused or captured by any par156
ticular group. One way to achieve this is to require both national and
subnational institutions (or communities) to consider proposed amendments. This gives each level of government an effective means of preventing misuse of the amendment power, and, therefore, makes capture
more difficult.
There is evidence that Article V in the United States Constitution was
designed with a checks-and-balances rationale in mind. During the debates in 1787, some delegates initially expressed concern about Congress’

very definition of tyranny.’ To protect liberty . . . power must be divided, [and]
[f]ederalism serves this purpose by parceling out government powers among
different levels of government, giving each level of government, national and
subnational, powers sufficient to allow each to monitor and check the abuses of the
other.”).
154
See Albert, supra note 22, at 957–60 (describing how amendment rules can be
designed to provide effective “safeguards” for federalism).
155
See Gardner & Ininet, supra note 150, at 494; Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L.
Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79
Cornell L. Rev. 1045, 1121 (1994) (discussing the assumption that government
power will be misused if it is consolidated).
156
The concern here is not only that the amendment power might be used to
eliminate the federal arrangement, but that the amendment power might be used to
further policies or interests that are not in the public good. This sort of “capture” of
government power is a familiar concern in the agency context. See Clayton P. Gillette
& James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027, 1064–69 (1990)
(describing the problem of agency capture).
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157

role in the amendment process. Specifically, there was concern that if
Congress was required to approve all proposed amendments, it “may
158
abuse [its] power, and refuse . . . consent on that very account.” The
“convention” method of amendment, which does not require any ratification by Congress, was chosen primarily to provide a check on potential
159
abuses by Congress. Using the convention method, the states can, at
least in theory, call a convention and unilaterally amend the Constitution
without Congress. Although the states have never ratified an amendment
by convention, it appears that the threat of a convention has operated as
160
an effective check on Congress from time to time.
Constitutional designers should be aware that decentralizing the
amendment power can be an effective strategy for fostering healthy
checks-and-balances and preventing harmful capture of the amendment
power.
C. Protecting Self-Governance and Accommodating Collective Rights
A third reason to decentralize the amendment power may be to
promote self-governance by subnational communities. Some countries
decentralize political power to enable some degree of self-governance by
161
subnational communities. In those systems, subnational government
exists, in part, to ensure that subnational communities can exercise a de162
gree of political self-determination. Subnational government can allow
communities to enact their own policies (through subnational legislatures), enforce their own laws (through subnational executives), and/or
157

See Farrand, supra note 53, at 202–03.
Id.
159
Id.; see James Kenneth Rogers, Note, The Other Way to Amend the Constitution:
The Article V Constitutional Convention Amendment Process, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
1005, 1015 (2007) (“The records of the Constitutional Convention clearly show that
the purpose of the Convention Clause was to protect the States against a recalcitrant
or corrupt Congress.”).
160
See Rogers, supra note 159 at 1008–09 (suggesting that the threat of
constitutional convention was a “key factor” in causing Congress to “act preemptively
to propose the desired amendment itself” and noting that this may have occurred
regarding the Bill of Rights, Seventeenth Amendment, Twenty-First Amendment,
Twenty-Second Amendment, and Twenty-Fifth Amendment).
161
Ethiopia’s federal system illustrates this. The Ethiopian Constitution includes
the right of consolidated political groups within existing subnational units to apply
for statehood. See Constitution of the Federal Democratic of Ethiopia, Aug. 21,
1995, art. 47(3) [hereinafter Const. of Eth.]. The Constitution recognizes “[t]he
right of any Nation, Nationality or People to form its own state . . . .” Id.; see Alemante
G. Selassie, Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa, 28 Yale J. Int’l L. 51, 64
(2003) (discussing this provision in the Ethiopian constitution).
162
See G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutions and Minority Rights: A Perspective on
Canadian Provincial Constitutionalism, 40 Rutgers L.J. 767, 783 (2009) (explaining
that the right of political self-determination is the most basic collective right).
158
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163

resolve their own disputes (through subnational tribunals). This kind
of structure is common in “divided societies” that are comprised of many
164
diverse subnational groups.
However, for political self-determination to be meaningful, subnational government must have some degree of independence from the
preferences and policies of national institutions, and even the aggregate
165
national community. Implicit in this system is a protected “space”
where subnational governments can operate without interference from
166
national institutions. Although this “space” can be preserved through a
variety of different mechanisms, a particularly effective method of ensuring that subnational communities retain a degree of independence is to
ensure that they can participate in any amendments to the national constitutional structure. Including subnational units in that process helps ensure that community rights, which might implicate only a small minority,
are not infringed by national political institutions representing majoritar167
ian preferences.
Ethiopia’s amendment process provides a good example. Ethiopia is
an ethnic federal system that was intended to accommodate dramatic
168
ethnic diversity under one constitutional system. “The main purpose
was to achieve ethnic and regional autonomy, while maintaining the state
169
of Ethiopia as a political unit.” Consequently, Ethiopia is comprised of
170
nine ethnicity-based territorial regions, and the Ethiopian Constitution
171
“affirms the unrestricted corporate right of all ethnic groups.” Ethiopia’s amendment rules reflect this prioritization of subnational self-

163

See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Models of Subnational Constitutionalism, 115 Penn
St. L. Rev. 1151, 1169–72 (2011) (explaining this approach to subnational
constitutionalism).
164
See James A. Gardner, In Search of Subnational Constitutionalism, 4 Eur. Const.
L. Rev. 325, 333 (2008) (discussing “ethnocultural self-determination as a justification
for federalism”).
165
See Marshfield, supra note 163, at 1169–72.
166
See Robert Williams & G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutional Space: A View from
the States, Provinces, Regions, Länder and Cantons, in Federalism, Subnational
Constitutions, and Minority Rights 3, 15–16 (G. Alan Tarr et al. eds., 2004)
(describing this concept as it relates to subnational units’ authority to adopt their
own constitutions).
167
See Livingston, supra note 31, at 312. (“All these [amendment]
instrumentalities are designed to preclude the possibility that a mere majority of the
people in the whole nation will impose upon a minority of dissident states an
amendment to the constitution to which they are opposed.”).
168
See Alem Habtu, Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause
in the Constitution, 35 Publius 313, 313 (2005) (describing social conditions
underlying Ethiopia’s constitutional structure).
169
Id.
170
Id. at 313, 331.
171
Id. at 329.
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governance. Constitutional provisions relating to the rights of ethnic
groups, including the right of secession may be amended only if they are
approved by a majority in all regional parliaments and a supermajority in
172
both houses of the national legislature. Thus, Ethiopia has decentralized the amendment power to ensure that subnational ethnic groups re173
tain a protected “space” for self-governance.
Constitutional designers, especially in divided societies, should be
aware that robust protection of collective rights might also require some
form of decentralization of the amendment power.
D. Decentralization as a Means of Enriching the Constitutional Debate
Another reason for decentralizing the amendment power may be to
promote diverse voices in the amendment process and improve deliberation. Some democratic theorists maintain that public decision-making
bodies benefit from processes that include more diverse representa174
tives.
As Jeremy Waldron claims, when “diverse perspectives are
brought together in a collective decision-making process, that process
will be informed by much greater informational resources than those
175
that attend the decision-making of any single individual.” In other
words, the quality of public decisions may improve if decision-making
processes include more stakeholders with a diversity of knowledge, expe176
rience, and interests. The basic logic is that diversity of viewpoints will
facilitate constructive deliberation, which, in turn, will improve the ulti177
mate quality of substantive decisions.

172

See Const. of Eth., art. 105; see also Habtu, supra note 168, at 329 (discussing
how this amendment procedure was intended to protect the collective rights of
subnational ethnic groups).
173
This rationale is very obvious in countries that include subnational
government only in amendments that affect the rights and duties of subnational
communities. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing subject-matter inclusion of subnational
units). These subject-matter “triggers” for subnational involvement aim to ensure that
subnational communities retain a degree of control over their status in the
constitutional structure.
174
See Jeremy Waldron, Representative Law Making, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 335, 343 (2009)
(“The key here is diversity. Different people bring different perspectives to bear on
the issues under discussion and the more people there are the greater the richness
and diversity of viewpoints are going to be.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1575 (1988) (stating that “‘differences of
opinion’ and ‘jarring of parties’ can ‘promote deliberation’”).
175
Waldron, supra note 174, at 343.
176
See id.; Sunstein, supra note 174, at 1575–76 (“Disagreement . . . [is] a creative
and productive force, highly congenial to and even an indispensable part of the basic
republican faith in political dialogue.”).
177
See Sunstein, supra note 174, at 1588 n.262 (explaining the relationship
between diversity of opinions in collective decision-making and quality of choice).
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If one accepts this general theory of collective choice, then these
principles would seem to apply equally to constitutional amendment decisions. Amendment decisions may benefit from a diversity of viewpoints,
178
interests, knowledge, and expertise. In this regard, subnational communities provide unique and valuable information that can inform con179
stitutional debate. Subnational representatives may be uniquely aware
180
of local issues, interests, expertise, or values. They may also be best situated to anticipate any unique effects that amendments may have on their
181
particular community. Centralizing the amendment power risks losing
this valuable information.
Germany may provide a relevant illustration here. Germany is often
characterized as an administrative federal state because the federal government is primarily responsible for making policy and the länder are
182
primarily responsible for administering and implementing that policy.
Additionally, “[t]he division of responsibilities in German federalism is
not one of strict separation, however; rather, it is a system of cooperation,
183
interconnections, and interrelationships.” Notwithstanding this cooperative federal structure, the länder are still given an independent voice in
the amendment process through their representatives in the Bundesrat,
which is the second national legislative chamber designed to represent
länd interests. Amendment of the German constitution requires a two184
thirds vote in both the Bundesrat and the Bundestag. Representatives in
the Bundesrat are delegated by länd governments and each delegation

178

See Rasch & Congleton, supra note 29, at 331 (discussing inclusion and
consensus in constitutional amendment rules); Amar, supra note 80, at 110–11
(acknowledging that amendment decisions should be subject to meaningful
deliberation).
179
See Waldron, supra note 174, at 344 (“If the community is geographically
diverse, for example, with different conditions in the North compared with those in
the South, then one would value the presence of legislators from both ends of the
country; if there is diversity of interests as between town and country, again one
would value the presence of people from rural and urban sectors.”).
180
See id.; Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 459, 480 (2002) (explaining that even in highly technical areas
such as environmental regulation, local representatives have valuable expertise,
knowledge, and information that can improve the quality of collective decisionmaking outcomes).
181
See Foster, supra note 180, at 480–84. Subnational government officials may
also have expertise regarding local administration or efficiencies that can inform
constitutional deliberations.
182
See Arthur Gunlicks, The Länder and German Federalism 60–61 (2003)
(“[T]he [German] federation in fact carries most of the responsibility for legislation,
while the Länder are primarily responsible for administration.”).
183
Id. at 61.
184
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law) [GG],
art. 79 (Ger.).
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must vote as a bloc. Although this structure may serve a variety of pur186
poses, it would seem to ensure that the länder are heard on issues related to their responsibilities as the administrators and implementers of
federal law. The länder offer a unique perspective that other representatives and institutions would not likely provide.
This rationale for decentralizing the amendment power may also explain why some “unitary” systems have nevertheless included subnational
187
representatives in the national amendment process. Afghanistan’s constitution, for example, declares that Afghanistan is a “unitary and indi188
visible state.” The Constitution also provides that the “central administration shall be divided into several administrative units,” called
189
190
provinces. The provinces have separately elected provincial councils,
which each elect a member to represent their province in the upper
191
chamber of the National Legislature (the House of Elders). Amendments to Afghanistan’s constitution require approval of the majority of
192
the members of both houses. In this way, provincial council members
are directly included in the amendment process.
Systems like Afghanistan are somewhat curious from a constitutional
design perspective. Because these systems are expressly unitary, they are
not generally concerned with promoting legitimacy by soliciting approval
from subnational polities. Further, these systems are not necessarily concerned with protecting local self-government or ensuring that subnational government can provide an effective check on national government.
Instead, subnational institutions exist primarily to work cooperatively in
administering national policies and delivering national services. Why
then, are their amendment rules structured to include subnational representatives? One possible explanation, from an institutional design per185

See Gunlicks, supra note 182, at 346.
It likely was also intended to protect larger länder from unfair fiscal burdens
and ensure a check on national institutions. See id. (“To ensure that they would at
least be able to block constitutional amendments that they might see as damaging
their interests, in particular fiscal equalization among the Länder, the four large
Länder in the West were given 6 votes each . . . in the amendment to the Basic
Law . . . .”).
187
My survey revealed at least fifteen such systems. To identify these systems, I
cross referenced my data with the CCP data that identify systems that are expressly
unitary. See infra Part III.A (explaining my empirical methodology and use of CCP
data). Those systems are: Albania, Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus, Bolivia, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Colombia, Guinea, Moldova, Namibia, Nicaragua, Portugal,
and Spain. In many of these systems, subnational government appears to be a result
of administrative decentralization.
188
See Const. of Afg., ch. 1, art. 1.
189
See id. ch. IIX, art. 136.
190
See id. ch. IIX, art. 138.
191
See id. ch. V, art. 84.
192
See id. ch. X, art. 149.
186
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spective, is that these systems recognize that subnational government officials and communities are uniquely situated to understand how constitutional changes will affect aspects of administrative efficiency. Thus, in
order to ensure that constitutional changes are informed by subnational
administrative perspectives, these systems include subnational units in
the amendment process.
In any event, constitutional designers should be aware that including
subnational communities in national amendment processes may enrich
and improve the overall quality of the decision-making process.
III. EXISTING DECENTRALIZATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT RULES
Existing scholarship generally considers decentralization of the
amendment power to be a characteristic of formal federal systems where
amendment rules are structured to “safeguard” federalism by giving sub193
national units strong veto rights. However, my review of amendment
rules in every extant national constitution demonstrates that many countries decentralize the amendment power in complex and creative ways
and that some federal systems do not decentralize the amendment power
at all. This Part provides a summary of the dominant approaches to decentralizing the amendment power based on my review of all extant constitutions. It has three major Sections. The first Section briefly describes
my general methodology and dataset for reviewing and cataloguing the
amendment rules. The second Section presents and analyzes the decentralization mechanisms that I discovered. The final Section discusses the
few anomalous federal systems with strongly centralized amendment
rules that came to light during my review.
A. Empirical Methodology
Before presenting my findings, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of my methodology in reviewing and analyzing the amendment
rules. There are four important methodological points.
First, as others have observed, any comparative constitutional study
must address the reality that some constitutions are “sham” constitu194
tions. That is, many constitutions do not reflect how “power is actually

193

See, e.g., Albert, supra note 22, at 967–60 (discussing how subnational units are
given power in amendment process to safeguard federalism); Livingston, supra note
31, at 14; Markus Kaltenborn, Constitutional Amendment Rules in Federal and Unitary
States, in Changing Federal Constitutions 271, 272 (Arthur Benz & Felix Knupling
eds., 2012) (noting that federal systems have unique amendment procedures).
194
See, e.g., Albert, supra note 22, at 915; see also Lutz, supra note 28, at 152 (“Any
comparative study of the amendment process must first distinguish true
constitutional systems from those that use a constitution as window dressing . . . .”).
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exercised and constrained” in their corresponding societies. Because of
this, many comparative studies include only democracies where there is
some evidence that the constitution is respected and followed as higher
196
law. This limitation is important if the purpose of the study is to explore systems where “democratic constitutional design” reflects “demo197
cratic practice in fact.” However, my purpose here is broader. I want to
identify all the ways that constitutional designers have purported to allo198
cate the amendment power between levels of government. My primary
goal is to construct a complete taxonomy of design choices based on the
199
procedures captured in existing constitutional provisions. Even if some
of those provisions are only “window dressing” in their respective societies, this does not mean that they should not be studied for their poten200
tial application in other contexts. Thus, I did not limit my review to only functioning constitutional democracies. Instead, I reviewed the
amendment rules in all extant national constitutions.
To conduct this review, I used the constitutional repository created
201
by the Comparative Constitutions Project (“CCP”). At the time I fin-

195

Albert, supra note 22, at 915 (citing Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A
Preliminary Discussion, 56 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 853, 861–62 (1962)).
196
See, e.g., id. at 915 (“Although sham constitutions entrench formal amendment
rules, their entrenched rules do not actually bind political actors, nor do citizens
accept them as accurate and legitimate reflections of how power is actually exercised
and constrained.”).
197
Id. (basing conclusions on “analysis of amendment rules in the world’s
highest-performing democratic countries”).
198
See Lutz, supra note 28, at 148 (“Although it is true that a constitution is often
used as ideological window dressing, . . . few political systems, whether dictatorial or
democratic, fail to reflect major political change in their respective constitutions,
[and that] when carefully read, [constitutions] are windows into [the] underlying
political reality.”).
199
Not all comparative constitutional studies limit themselves to functioning
democracies. See Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 8–10, 47–64 (describing comparative
study of constitutional design features that studied “almost the full population of
national constitutions since 1789”); Tom Ginsburg et al., Do Executive Term Limits
Cause Constitutional Crises?, in Comparative Constitutional Design, supra note 22,
at 350, 350–55 (explaining dataset for comparative study of executive term limits in
national constitutions).
200
Moreover, a comprehensive study of this kind has value precisely because it
identifies the kind of constitutional arrangements that exist in low-performing
democracies. See infra Part III.C. (discussing my discovery that some “federal” states
have strongly centralized amendment power; perhaps because those federal
arrangements are dominated by central control).
201
Comp. Const. Project, http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org. The CCP
is a large-scale academic initiative designed to collect all of the world’s constitutions.
See Finkel, supra note 20, at 11 (explaining that the CCP is the result of work by
Professors Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton); see also Constitute
Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/content/about?lang=en (explaining the
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ished my review in April 2014, the repository included full English versions of the 189 national constitutions that were “in force in September
202
of 2013.” I reviewed the amendment rules in each of those constitutions as well as the new constitutions of Fiji, (adopted in late 2013) and
203
Tunisia and Egypt (both adopted in January 2014). Appendix A lists
the countries as well as the adoption year of each constitution that I reviewed.
Second, because the primary focus of my review was to study how
constitutional amendment rules include “subnational units” in the
amendment process, it is important to define that concept.
“Subnationalism” can have many meanings in political science and public
204
law. It may, for example, refer generally to smaller cultural, religious,
205
linguistic, or ethnic communities within a national jurisdiction. These
communities may not have any specific constitutional status and they may
206
not be concentrated in a particular subnational jurisdiction. However,
within public-law scholarship, especially literature discussing federalism,
“subnational units” usually refers to constitutionally recognized intermediate territorial jurisdictions such as states, provinces, cantons, or re207
gions. It may also refer to non-territorial subnational communities that
project). In conjunction with Google, CCP has released http://constituteproject.org,
which is a searchable full-text database of the world’s constitutions.
202
See Constitute Project, supra note 201 (stating that the repository includes
“the constitution that was in force in September of 2013 for nearly every independent
state in the world”). According to CCP, “certain countries whose constitutional order
consists of multiple documents, or whose constitutions are in transition, are
temporarily omitted.” Id. My review omitted those countries not contained in the
CCP database.
203
Thus, my review captured all available extant national constitutions through
January 2014. See Appendix A.
204
See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 125, at 20–21 (discussing subnationalism from a
public law standpoint in the United States); Helena Catt & Michael Murphy, SubState Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Design 18 (2002)
(describing subnationalism from a political science perspective as a “collectivity of
people living within an existing state who express a strong sense of identification as a
distinct nation”).
205
See Joshua B. Forrest, Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances,
and Politics 1–8 (2004) (discussing the many uses of the concept in political science
and especially the changing notion that subnationalism refers to territorially
consolidated subnational populations); Aseema Sinha, The Regional Roots of
Developmental Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan 203–04 (2005) (using the
phrase to refer to “cultural subnationalism” in India).
206
See Forrest, supra note 205, at 5–6 (discussing how subnationalism does not
always trace territorial communities).
207
See James A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties,
and the National Colonization of State Politics, 29 J.L. & Pol. 1, 5 (2013) (using the
phrase in the context of public law to refer to intermediate subnational government).
Although the phrase “subnational” can technically also refer to local government
institutions, the term generally refers to intermediate or “regional” government
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208

have constitutionally protected statuses. Although it may be important
for future scholarship to investigate how amendment rules affect subnational communities that do not have any constitutional status, my focus
209
here is on constitutionally recognized subnational units.
Third, because the focus of this review was to identify all formal
mechanisms for including subnational units in the amendment process, I
structured it around a series of broad questions designed to capture all
210
existing decentralization techniques. For each constitution, I recorded
211
answers to the following questions:
 Do the amendment rules generally require approval by a
unicameral national legislature that contains at least some
212
subnational representatives?
institutions. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Characteristics
of National Constitutions Codebook 128 (Apr. 18, 2014), http://
www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/files/surveyinstrument.pdf
(including
“local/municipal government” within “subnational government”). I use the phrase in
the regional sense.
208
See Arend Lijphart, Typologies of Democratic Systems, 1 Comp. Pol. Stud. 3, 32
(1968) (discussing non-territorial federal arrangements—or “consociational”
arrangements—that provide constitutional recognition for subnational groups rather
than subnational territories); see also Arend Lijphart, The Politics of
Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands 143 (1968)
(exploring the same concept in the Netherlands); Charles E. Ehrlich, Democratic
Alternatives to Ethnic Conflict: Consociationalism and Neo-separatism, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L.,
447, 457–459 (2000) (discussing Lebanon’s failed attempt at establishing nonterritorial federal system).
209
I did not restrict my analysis to territorially based subnational units, but there
are very few non-territorial systems.
210
See supra note 15 (explaining that decentralization as used in this Article refers
to a constitutionally protected vertical division of power between national and
subnational government institutions).
211
This “survey” approach to tracking textual variations across constitutions is an
established approach to comparative constitutional analysis. See, e.g., Henc van
Maarseveen & Ger van der Tang, supra note 40, at 17–20 (“The object of this
research is . . . to investigate the constitutional texts of national states in order to find
out whether certain of their provisions are similar, and if so to what extent.”); David
S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 Calif.
L. Rev. 1163, 1187–88 (2011); Law & Versteeg, supra note 41, at 770–71. This
approach has limitations. See id. at 1187–88. For one thing, it does not capture various
extrinsic factors that might affect how a constitutional text is applied. Id.
Nevertheless, it is a recognized and valuable method of studying formal constitutional
provisions across countries. Id.
212
This question captures systems where the national legislature is structured to
include at least some “representatives” of subnational units. I am interested in
identifying only those systems that provide for separate election or appointment of
subnational representatives distinct from representatives accountable to the larger
national constituency. It is not my purpose to explore all the eccentricities of each
country’s election rules. See Lijphart, supra note 15, at 143–70 (describing variations
in electoral systems around the world). Thus, if a system uses subnational units only

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2578091

LCB_19_4_Art_3_Marshfield (Do Not Delete)

2015]

4/17/2016 12:37 PM

DECENTRALIZING THE AMENDMENT POWER

999



Do the amendment rules generally require approval by a bicameral national legislature with a separate “subnational”
chamber or an upper chamber with some subnational repre213
sentatives?
 Do the amendment rules generally require direct ratification
of amendments by subnational units (either by popular referendum or approval by a subnational legislature)?
 Do the amendment rules limit subnational ratification to only certain subjects?
 Do the amendment rules impose any heighted restrictions
on amendments affecting subnational units or subnational
interests?
 Do the amendment rules allow for subnational units to initiate amendments?
 Do the amendment rules provide for any other miscellaneous institutions or procedures that include subnational
units?
After reviewing the constitutions, collecting this information, and recording any variations that did not fit neatly within my survey, I merged
214
my data with data available from the CCP. The CCP data provide other
as a basis for delineating multi-member electoral constituencies (with the number of
representatives based on the subnational unit’s proportion of the aggregate national
population), I do not consider that system to include subnational representatives in
the national legislature. See generally Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems:
Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems, 18 Int’l Pol. Sci. Rev. 297, 299 (1997)
(describing major electoral systems).
213
A system fits this description if it has an upper chamber dedicated to
representatives that, at least in theory, should represent the interests of their
subnational units. See Lijphart, supra note 15, at 187–88 (discussing bicameralism as
a means of ensuring that subnational interests are represented). The United States
Senate is an example of such an upper chamber (at least by design). Not all “upper
chambers” are dedicated solely to representation for subnational units. See Samuel C.
Patterson & Anthony Mughan, Senates and the Theory of Bicameralism, in Senates:
Bicameralism in the Contemporary World 1, 3–9 (Samuel C. Patterson &
Anthony Mughan eds., 1999) (summarizing all extant bicameral systems and noting
how representatives are elected or appointed to each upper chamber). Some systems
have a blended upper chamber that includes representatives from subnational units
and representatives appointed by the executive. See id. I classified a system as
including subnational units so long as its upper chamber included at least some
subnational representatives. I discuss the limitations that these “blended” upper
chambers might have for subnational interests in Part III.B.
214
In addition to the repository of constitutional texts, see supra note 202, the
CCP has created a massive database that codes the characteristics of most national
constitutions since 1789. See Constitute Project, supra note 201 (describing the
data and the coding process). The data include information related to 667 survey
questions completed by the CCP for each constitution. All data used are on file with
the author.
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important constitutional characteristics such as whether a constitution
identifies itself as expressly “federal” or “unitary” and whether a constitution creates or protects subnational units. Merging the data provided a
more complete picture of each constitution’s overall structure.
One final definition is important at this stage. Some constitutions
have separate procedures for constitutional “amendment” and constitu215
tional “revision.” Amendment generally refers to ad hoc changes to the
existing constitutional text without “a fundamental change that departs
216
from the presuppositions of the constitution.” Revision usually refers to
more wide-spread, systematic changes to the constitution and its core
217
principles. As other scholars have noted, the distinction between these
218
two concepts can be blurry. Although a study of decentralization in “revision” rules would likely provide important and related insight, my focus
here is exclusively on rules that relate to constitutional amendment.
Thus, I excluded from my review rules that relate exclusively to constitu219
tional revision.
B. Taxonomy of Decentralization Mechanisms
This Section presents a taxonomy of decentralization mechanisms
that is based on my review of the amendment rules contained in the approximately 191 extant national constitutions. My review identified five
dominant ways that subnational units are included in national amendment processes. Not all amendment rules fit neatly into the categories
described below, but these categories capture the dominant approaches.
This Section also provides a preliminary assessment of each method and
identifies additional factors that can affect subnational inclusion in constitutional amendment procedures.
1. Inclusion in the National Legislature
The most common way that subnational units are included in national amendment processes is by providing them with representation in
the national legislature, which is responsible for initiating and/or ap-

215

Constitutions display great variety in how they use and define these concepts.
See Albert, supra note 22, at 929–32 (describing variations and noting that the
distinction is sometimes implicit in constitutions).
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 55–59.
219
Some constitutions use the phrase “revise,” “revision,” or “reform” to refer to
amendment. See Albert, supra note 22, at 930 (noting that the Chilean Constitution
uses “reform”). As others have done, when a constitution uses those phrases without
distinguishing them from other types of alteration, I interpreted those provision to
relate to amendment. See id. (following this approach). Thus, I excluded from my
analysis only those provisions that provided an obvious separate procedure for
constitutional revision.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2578091

LCB_19_4_Art_3_Marshfield (Do Not Delete)

2015]

4/17/2016 12:37 PM

DECENTRALIZING THE AMENDMENT POWER

1001

proving proposed amendments. This method can take many different
forms and provide for varying degrees of inclusion for subnational units.
As explained further below, my review identified fifty-four systems that
attempt to decentralize amendment processes through either: (1) special
representation of subnational units in a unicameral national legislature;
220
or (2) representation in a separate “upper” legislative chamber. However, on closer look, there seems to be a variety of extrinsic factors that
can undermine or dilute decentralization of the amendment power when
this is the sole mechanism for including subnational units in the
amendment process.
a. Subnational Representatives in a Unicameral Legislature
Many amendment rules allow the national legislature to amend the
221
constitution by adopting a constitutional law. These amendment rules
can sometimes incorporate subnational units because the national legislature includes some subnational representatives. Those subnational representatives are sometimes elected directly by subnational communities,
but they may also be appointed or nominated by subnational officials or
institutions. In any event, by including subnational representatives in the
national legislature, these systems attempt to provide subnational units
with a voice in the national amendment process. My review identified
twelve countries that require a unicameral legislature with some subna222
tional representatives to approve amendments.
The small South American country of Guyana provides an example.
Guyana’s unicameral National Assembly can amend the constitution by
passing a constitutional bill that is supported by a majority of its 65 mem223
bers. Under the original default election rules, 53 representatives were
224
elected from a national list based on proportional representation. Guyana’s ten Regional Councils, which are separately elected, each elected
one council representative as an additional member of the National As220

This includes systems such as the United States and Australia that also require
subnational units to directly approve amendments.
221
Often, but not always, constitutional laws must be adopted by a supermajority
in the national legislature and/or confirmed by a popular referendum. See Albert,
supra note 22, at 919–24 (providing a summary of basic procedures in amendment
rules).
222
Those systems are: Andorra, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cyprus, El Salvador,
Guinea, Guyana, Kosovo, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Portugal, and Tanzania.
223
See Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana Oct. 6, 1980,
pt. I, ch. vi, tit. 52, sec. 1. Certain amendments require a subsequent referendum to
ratify them. Id. pt. I, ch. vi, tit. 164, sec. 1.
224
See id. pt. I, ch. vi, tit. 60, sec. 2. These rules were altered by subsequent acts of
the National Assembly to ensure more proportional representation. Thus, the system
now includes twenty-five representatives elected from multi-member constituencies
that correspond to the ten regions, and forty representatives elected proportionally
from a national list. See Frequently Asked Questions, Guy. Elections Comm’n,
http://www.gecom.org.gy/faq.html.
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225

sembly. Thus, although national representatives dominate the National
Assembly, the regions are represented by members chosen by the Regional Councils, and those representatives are necessarily included in the
national amendment process.
The island country of Cyprus provides another interesting example.
Cyprus has a unicameral national legislature (House of Representatives)
226
with authority to amend the constitution. However, the constitution requires that 30% of the legislative seats must be reserved for the Cypriot
227
Turkish community. Amendment requires “at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Greek Community
and at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belong228
ing to the Turkish Community.” Thus, this system was specifically designed to include subnational interests in the national amendment process. In reality, however, this inclusion of minority subnational interests
has been a non-factor because the Turkish community has not taken its
229
seats in the legislature since 1964.
Another less obvious variation on this method is for systems to incorporate subnational interests by electing some representatives proportionally from an aggregate national constituency and some representa230
tives from subnational constituencies. For example, representatives to
the unicameral Legislative Assembly in El Salvador are elected from fourteen multi-seat constituencies corresponding to the fourteen subnational
231
“departments” as well as from a single national constituency. Because
the El Salvador Constitution can be amended only by the Legislative As232
sembly, this dual election system provides (at least in theory) a mechanism for subnational interests to be represented in the amendment process.
Including subnational units only by providing them with representation in a unicameral national legislature has significant limitations. First,
225
See Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana Oct. 6, 1980,
pt. I, ch. vi, tit. 60, sec. 3.
226
See Sntagma tee Kypreeak Theemokrata Aug. 16, 1960, pt. XIII, art. 182,
sec. 3 (Cyprus) [hereinafter Const. of Cyprus].
227
See id. pt. IV, art. 62, sec. 2.
228
See id. pt. XIII, art. 182, sec. 3.
229
See W.M. Dobell, Division of Cyprus, 22 Int’l J. 278, 284 (1967) (noting that
Turkish representatives withdrew). For a full discussion of the “Cyprus problem” and
the issues related to the Turkish vacation of the government created by the 1960
Constitution, see Tozun Bahcheli & Sid Noel, The Quest for a Political Settlement in
Cyprus: Is a Dyadic Federation Viable?, 44 Publius 659 (2014).
230
See Norris, supra note 212, at 299 (describing how electoral systems can be
structured in this way).
231
This system is not constitutionally established. See Constitución de la
República de El Salvador Dec. 15, 1983, tit. II, art. 79 (authorizing election rules
for Legislative Assembly to be established by law).
232
See id. tit. IX, art. 248.
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because of the countervailing policy of proportional representation, sys233
tems often ensure that subnational representatives are in the minority.
Thus, subnational representatives are unlikely to be able to block
amendments that adversely affect subnational interests or secure
234
amendments that protect subnational interests. This does not mean
that their inclusion is meaningless. Including subnational representatives
ensures that subnational communities have a voice in the amendment
process even if they might not determine the outcome. However, because
subnational representatives are often outnumbered, their inclusion is
largely for purposes of enriching the amendment debate rather than
contributing to its outcome.
Second, systems that are dominated by national political parties often weaken the distinction between “subnational representatives” and
235
other members of the national legislature. Strong national party competition tends to dominate voter preferences to the point where a candidate’s party association is more important (to the representative and vot236
ers) than the candidate’s subnational loyalties.
This means that
subnational representatives have less incentive to protect subnational interests during the amendment process and are primarily concerned with
237
national party interests.
Finally, many constitutions allow the legislature to set election rules
through ordinary legislation. In those systems, inclusion of subnational
units through representation in the national legislature may not be constitutionally protected, and subnational units could be excluded from the
238
process simply by amending a statute. Nevertheless, many systems, such
as Cyprus and Tanzania, constitutionalize inclusion of subnational units

233

There are several unicameral systems that allow subnational units to have only
a minority of representatives in the national legislature. See, e.g., Constitution of
the Republic of Angola, Jan. 21, 2010, art. 144 (providing that 130 members are
elected proportionally and 90 members are elected by subnational districts); see also
Kevin Roust & Olga Shvetsova, Representative Democracy as a Necessary Condition for the
Survival of a Federal Constitution, 37 Publius 244 (2007) (arguing that long-lasting
federal democracies need proportionally representative institutions).
234
Of course, subnational representatives may sometimes find themselves in a
situation where they are the swing vote for a proposed amendment, which might
bring subnational interests to the forefront of an amendment proposal.
235
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing this issue).
236
There is much literature on this point. See, e.g., Marta Arretche, Federalism,
Bicameralism, and Institutional Change: General Trends and One Case Study, 5 Braz. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 10, 24 (2010) (explaining how national political parties affect subnational
representation in Brazilian Senate).
237
Id.
238
See supra note 224 (discussing Guyana’s constitutional arrangement and
legislation affecting subnational representation).
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in the national legislature, making this a real method of including subna239
tional units.
b. Bicameralism and Subnational Interests in the Amendment
Process
Some bicameral systems include subnational units by dedicating a
legislative chamber to subnational interests (to some degree) and requir240
ing that constitutional amendments be approved by that chamber. This
is a familiar characteristic of federal systems, where the “upper chamber”
is designed to ensure that regional interests are not overrun by aggregate
241
“populational” majorities. Election to this upper chamber can vary.
Some systems such as Austria, the Netherlands, and Sudan provide that
242
representatives must be elected by subnational legislatures. Other systems, such as the United States and Australia, require subnational communities to directly elect representatives. In any event, these systems include subnational representatives in a second legislative chamber to
243
some degree and require that chamber to participate in amendments.

239

See Const. of Cyprus pt. IV, art. 62 (“Out of the number of Representatives
provided in paragraph I of this Article seventy per centum shall be elected by the
Greek Community and thirty per centum by the Turkish Community separately from
amongst their members respectively.”); Const. of Tanz. ch. 3, pt. 3, § 98 (explaining
that Parliament cannot pass any law that would reduce Zanzibar’s representation in
unicameral legislature).
240
See Nichols Aroney, Formation, Representation and Amendment in Federal
Constitutions, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 277, 326 (2006) (describing the upper chamber in
several federal systems as a “States House”).
241
See Arretche, supra note 236, at 20. Bicameralism is often associated with
federal systems that include a second chamber to protect the interests of the
constituent states. Id. However, many systems that are not truly “federal” have
adopted bicameralism and included second chambers that represent other minority
interests, provide specialized expertise, or simply operate as a further check-andbalance on government power. The Czech Republic and the Philippines are
examples.
242
The Democratic Republic of the Congo also operates in this way.
243
Those systems are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus,
Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Colombia, Congo,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, German Federal
Republic, Haiti, India, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania,
Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Somalia, South
Sudan, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, United States of America, Uzbekistan,
and Zimbabwe. Many systems have added members to the second legislative chamber
that represent other interests such as the academy, trade associations, cultural
groups, and municipal government. I have included these systems in my list if they
nevertheless guarantee seats in the second chamber for representatives from
constitutionally protected intermediate subnational units.
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Interestingly, a few systems that are not formally federal have adopted
244
this approach.
It appears that Australia’s Senate was intended to ensure that state
interests were protected in the national legislature, including in the
245
amendment process. Australia’s constitution can be amended by,
among other things, approval from both chambers of the national legis246
lature—the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Senate is
comprised of twelve senators from each state, regardless of the state’s
population, and two senators from the two autonomous internal territo247
ries. Because senators are elected directly by state communities and all
states are equally represented, “it was hoped and expected that the Senate would serve as the agency within the structure of the national gov248
ernment that would protect the rights of the states.”
Similarly, Brazil’s constitution is amended by approval of both legis249
lative chambers, the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. The
Federal Senate is comprised of three representatives from each state and
250
three representatives of the Federal District. The Brazilian Senate was
251
also apparently intended to represent state interests in this way.
However, national political parties seem to significantly undermine
the effectiveness of this type of subnational inclusion. In Australia, for
example, there is evidence that senator voting preferences are guided by
party association more than state loyalties, especially on proposed consti252
tutional amendments. A study of all constitutional amendment proposals submitted to referendum between 1901 and 1961 showed that

244

Haiti’s Senate is an example. Constitution of the Republic of Haiti Mar.
29, 1987, art 94.
245
See Livingston, supra note 31, at 129–33; see also William H. Riker, The Senate
and American Federalism, in The Development of American Federalism 135, 138–39
(William H. Riker ed., 1987) (discussing United States Senate in this context).
246
See Australian Constitution s 128. If one house twice refuses to concur in a
proposed amendment, the Governor–General can circumvent this requirement and
send the proposal to referendum. Id.
247
See id. s 7.
248
See Livingston, supra note 31, at 129.
249
See Constituição Federal [C.F.] Oct. 5, 1988, art. 60 [hereinafter Const. of
Braz.].
250
See id. art. 46, sec. 1.
251
See Arretche, supra note 236, at 28 (discussing the intended role of the
Brazilian Senate).
252
See Livingston, supra note 31, at 130–33; see also Francis G. Castles & John
Uhr, Australia: Federal Constraints and Institutional Innovations, in Federalism and the
Welfare State: New World and European Experiences 51, 85–86 (Herbert
Obinger et al. eds., 2005); Samuel C. Patterson & Anthony Mughan, Fundamentals of
Institutional Design: The Function and Powers of Parliamentary Second Chambers, 7 J. Legis.
Stud. 39, 39–60 (2001) (discussing agency issues related to representatives in “upper
chambers”).
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senators’ voting records displayed greater party coherence than state co253
herence. Similarly, recent studies have shown that when voting on constitutional amendments, Brazil’s Senate is characterized primarily by na254
tional “partisan cohesion” rather than state loyalty. This finding is sigsignificant because Brazil was previously believed to exhibit little national
255
party cohesion in the Senate on account of strong subnational loyalties.
Another limitation on this method is the structure of the legislature’s
“upper chamber.” Although many systems structure their upper chambers around representation of subnational units, many bicameral systems
have “diluted” this focus by including representatives of other minority
groups and special interests. In Algeria for example, the constitution can
be amended if both chambers of the national Parliament approve the
256
amendment. Although two-thirds of the upper chamber (Council of
Nations) are elected by subnational legislatures, the remaining third are
appointed by the President “from among the personalities and national
elites in the scientific, cultural, professional, economic and social
257
fields.” Thus, the Algerian Senate is not exclusively dedicated to subna258
tional interests.
A further limitation is the alternative use of nation-wide referenda to
amend national constitutions. Some systems such as Belarus not only require amendments to be ratified by a legislative chamber representing
subnational units, but also permit amendments to be ratified, in the al259
ternative, by a nation-wide referendum. Thus, the amendment rules offer two pathways, only one of which provides subnational communities
with an opportunity to participate in the process.
In sum, although bicameral systems may appear to be more effective
at including subnational units, available evidence suggests that there are
still significant limitations, especially in countries that have strong national political parties.
253

Castles & Uhr, supra note 252, at 85–86.
See Arretche, supra note 236, at 28; see also Roland Sturm, Austria, in
Handbook of Federal Countries 45, 49–50 (Ann L. Griffiths ed., 2005) (discussing
same issue in Austria).
255
See Scott Mainwaring, Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in
Comparative Perspective, 24 Comp. Pol. 21, 32 (1991) (explaining Brazil’s local political
party system).
256
See Dstwurr al-Jumhuriat al-Jazayiriat al-Dimuqratiat al-Shaebia Feb. 23, 1989,
tit. IV, art. 174 [hereinafter Const. of Alg.]. An approved amendment must also be
ratified in a national referendum. Id. Additionally, certain amendments can be
approved by a three-quarters vote of both chambers of Parliament. Id. art. 176.
257
See id. tit. II, ch. II, art. 101.
258
Other systems with a similar “hybrid” structure in their upper chamber
include Kenya, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe.
259
See Kanstytucyja Respubliki Bielarus Mar. 15, 1994, § 8, art. 140 [hereinafter
Const. of Belr.]. Kenya, Burundi, Namibia, the Congo, and the Comoros also have
similar systems.
254
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2. Direct Consent of Subnational Units
A few systems directly incorporate subnational units into constitutional amendments by requiring that subnational communities or institu260
tions directly ratify proposed amendments. This method is often, but
not always combined with approval by the national legislature. In all,
there are approximately eleven systems that generally require subnation261
al ratification on most proposed amendments, and six systems that require subnational ratification only on specific issues affecting subnational
262
interests. In theory, this method of inclusion would seem to be more
effective than representation in the national legislature because it reduces agency costs associated with sending subnational representatives to the
national legislature.
Mechanisms for approval by subnational units vary. Some systems
such as Mexico require the majority of state legislatures to approve the
263
amendment. Other systems, such as Australia, Micronesia, and Palau
require a majority (or super-majority) of the subnational units to ratify
264
the amendment through subnational referenda. Iraq is unusual in that
it requires amendments affecting particular regions to be ratified by both
265
the regional legislatures and regional populations via referenda. Somalia’s constitution provides an interesting twist on this theme. After a proposed amendment is approved by one of the national legislative chambers, the two chambers must form a “joint committee” to review the
266
proposed amendment. The Somalian constitution provides that the
joint committee must “[e]ngage Federal Member State legislatures and
incorporate the Federal Member States’ harmonized submissions into
the proposed amendment, whereas the matter concerns Federal Member
267
State interests.”
It is difficult to assess this method of decentralization, but anecdotal
evidence from the United States, Australia, and Switzerland seem to sup-

260

This method of including subnational units is often characterized as distinctly
federal. See Aroney, supra note 240, at 326 (discussing amendment rules in federal
systems).
261
Those systems are: Australia, Canada, the Comoros, Ethiopia, Mexico,
Micronesia, Nigeria, Palau, Russia, Switzerland, and United States of America.
262
Those systems are: Iraq, Kiribati, South Africa, Uganda, India, and Pakistan.
263
See Const. of Mexico, tit 8, art. 125.
264
See Australian Constitution, s 128; Constitution of the Federated
States of Micronesia May 10, 1975, art. XIV, sec. 1 [hereinafter Const. of Micr.];
Constitution of the Republic of Palau Apr. 2, 1979, art. XIV, sec 2.
265
See Article 126, Section 4, Dustur Jumhuriyat al-’Iraq 2005 [hereinafter Const.
of Iraq].
266
See Dastuurka Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya 2012, ch. 15, tit. 1,
art. 132(5) [hereinafter Const. of Som.].
267
See id. ch. 15 tit. 1, art. 132(6)(f).
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268

port its effectiveness at including subnational units. In the United
States, for example, the states have failed to ratify six amendments that
both the Senate and House of Representatives approved by a two-thirds
269
majority. This suggests a degree of independent judgment by the states
that presumably reflects state interests not captured by national institutions. Further, the states have failed to ratify several amendments that
likely would have been approved at an aggregate nation-wide referen270
dum. The most notable example is the Equal Rights Amendment,
which was designed to guarantee equal rights to women. The Amendment was approved by Congress in 1972 and submitted to the states for
ratification. In the first years after its passage, most public opinion polls
271
showed national majorities favoring the Amendment. However, the
Amendment failed because it was ratified by only thirty-five states, three
272
states short of the required super-majority. Many complex explanations
have been offered for the Amendment’s failure, but there is strong support for the conclusion that the Amendment failed because a minority of
273
opposition states effectively exercised their veto authority.
The adoption of the original Bill of Rights implicated a similar issue.
Included with the Bill of Rights was a proposed amendment concerning
274
the apportionment of the House of Representatives. Congress approved the amendment and submitted it to the states for ratification. Only ten states approved the amendment, which was one state short of the
275
super-majority required at the time. Interestingly, it is estimated that
the ten ratifying states accounted for approximately 79.6% of the nation-

268

See Livingston, supra note 31, at 312–13 (discussing instances where states
have vetoed amendments in Switzerland, Australia, and United States even though
amendments had aggregate nation-wide support).
269
See Cong. Research Serv., S. Doc. No. 112–9, The Constitution of the
United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation 49–51 (2014),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014/pdf/GPO-CONAN-REV2014.pdf (discussing proposed amendments not ratified by the states).
270
See Livingston, supra note 31, at 234–37 (recounting instances where
amendments failed state ratification even though they likely had aggregate
nationwide support); Louis Bolce et al., The Equal Rights Amendment, Public Opinion,
and American Constitutionalism, 4 Polity 551, 558 (1978).
271
Mark R. Daniels et al., The ERA Won—At Least in the Opinion Polls, 15 Pol. Sci.
578, 583–84 (1982) (discussing evidence of popular support for the Equal Rights
Amendment).
272
See S. Doc. No. 112–9, supra note 269, at 49–51 (listing proposed amendments
that were not ratified).
273
See Daniels et al., supra note 271, at 584 (analyzing various explanations and
concluding that a minority of states thwarted the process; although suggesting that
legislatures in those states were not responsive to constituent preferences).
274
See Livingston, supra note 31, at 234.
275
Id.
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276

al population. Thus, the amendment was defeated by states comprising
a “populational” minority at the time.
Australia’s experience with constitutional amendment is particularly
interesting in this regard because it requires an amendment to be ap277
proved simultaneously by national and state referenda. Because of
these rules, there have been six instances where the national referendum
approved an amendment but the amendment failed because a majority
278
of the states rejected it.
Although anecdotal, these instances suggest that requiring subnational units to directly endorse amendments can be a particularly potent
method of including subnational units. Inclusion of this sort provides
them with an effective means of protecting their own unique interests
through the “negative” action of vetoing amendments endorsed by national institutions, and even sometimes popular national majorities.
3. Subject-Matter Inclusion of Subnational Units
279
Amendment rules use subject-matter “triggers” in a variety of ways.
Some systems include subnational units in constitutional amendment on280
ly when the proposed amendment addresses certain subjects. Other systems use subject-matter triggers to increase subnational authority in the
281
amendment process. There is some variety in the subjects that “trigger”
subnational involvement, but issues related to the authority, jurisdiction,
282
and territory of subnational units are the most common triggers. The

276

Id.
See Australian Constitution s 128.
278
See Parliamentary Handbook, supra note 35, at 383, 385–86.
279
See Albert, supra note 22, at 942–43 (discussing subject-matter triggers in
constitutional amendment rules).
280
The following systems include subject-matter triggers related to subnational
involvement in the amendment process: India, Iraq, Kiribati, Pakistan, Russia, South
Africa, and Uganda.
281
For example, both Australia and the United States have strongly decentralized
amendment procedures for all proposed amendments, but they also impose
heightened requirements for amendments affecting state representation in their
respective Senates, and, in Australia, issues related to state boundaries. See U.S.
Const. art. V (“no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in
the Senate”); Australian Constitution s 128 (“No alteration diminishing the
proportionate representation of any State in either House of the Parliament, . . . or
increasing, diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of the State, . . . shall become
law unless the majority of the electors voting in that State approve the proposed
law.”). The following systems impose heightened restrictions for amendment that
affect certain subnational interests: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Dominican
Republic, Ethiopia, German Federal Republic, India, Iraq, Kiribati, Macedonia,
Madagascar, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and
United States of America.
282
Some constitutions also include categorical prohibitions on amendments
affecting the territory or jurisdiction of subnational units. See, e.g., Constitution de
277
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admission of new subnational units may also trigger subnational involve283
ment. Uganda’s constitution requires subnational involvement in proposals to amend tax provisions and provisions addressing local govern284
ment.
Ethiopia’s constitution requires subnational involvement
285
regarding any proposals to amend rights provisions. India’s constitution includes subnational units on any proposals regarding changes to
286
representation of the states in the national legislature.
The mechanisms for including subnational units vary greatly in this
regard. Most systems that include subject-matter triggers require subnational units to directly approve the proposed amendment, either through
referenda or subnational legislatures. In Austria, however, amendments
affecting the legislative or executive authority of the länder trigger a super-majority requirement in the Federal Council (Bundesrat), which is
287
comprised of representatives elected by länd legislatures. Macedonia
and Tanzania also include procedures based on representation in the na288
tional legislature. In Tanzania, any issues that affect Zanzibar must be
approved by two-thirds of Zanzibar’s representatives in the unicameral
289
national legislature. Iraq is unusual in that any amendments affecting
the authority of the Regions must be approved by a majority of the “concerned region[’s]” legislature and “the majority of its citizens in a general
290
referendum.” Finally, Pakistan has an unusual process whereby an affected province gets a specific veto on an amendment directed towards
291
it.

la Quatrième République de Madagascar Dec. 11, 2010, tit. VI, art. 163 (“The
principle of autonomy of the Decentralized Territorial Collectivities . . . may not be
made the object of revision.”).
283
See, e.g., Constitution of the Republic of Uganda Oct. 8, 1995, ch. 18,
art. 260.
284
See id. ch. 18, art. 260 (reference to ch. 9, art. 152 relates to tax chapter).
285
See Const. of Eth., art.105.
286
See India Const. art. XX, § 368, cl. 2.
287
See Const. of Austria ch. II, sec. D, art. 44. South Africa has a similar
procedure. See S. Afr. Const., 1996 ch. 4, pt. C (requiring National Council of
Provinces to approve amendments related to provincial authority and also requiring
provincial legislatures to approve any amendment that “concerns only a specific
province”).
288
See Ustavot na Republika Makedonija [Constitution] Nov. 20, 1991,
amend. XVII (Maced.) (“Such provisions and articles, shall require a two-thirds
majority vote of the total number of Representatives, within which there must be a
majority of the votes of the total number of Representatives who belong to the
communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia”).
289
See Const. of Tanz., ch. 3, pt. III, § 98(1)(b).
290
See Const. of Iraq § 6, art. 126(4).
291
See Pakistan Const. pt. XI, art. 239, § 4.
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These are just some of the many variations in these provisions, but
they illustrate that many systems have selectively decentralized the
amendment power by limiting subnational involvement to certain issues.
4. Inclusion of Subnational Units Through Special Institutions or
Procedures
A few constitutions provide that amendments must be reviewed
and/or approved by a special body convened for the purpose of considering amendments. The special body may be a joint meeting of both
chambers of the national legislature, or it may be a body wholly distinct
292
from the legislature. This is a very unusual process, but it can operate as
a unique decentralization mechanism when the special body is wholly
distinct from the national legislature and includes subnational representatives.
Malaysia provides the best example of this amendment procedure.
The Malaysian constitution provides that amendments related to certain
subjects (the special privileges of certain indigenous people, the official
language, or the status of indigenous monarchies) must be approved by
293
the “Conference of Rulers.” The Conference of Rulers is distinct from
the bicameral Malaysian Parliament, which is the primary law-making
294
body. For purposes of constitutional amendment, the Conference is
295
comprised of one representative from each state within Malaysia. Because of this configuration, the Conference seems designed to ensure
that subnational interests are represented in the amendment process on
certain subjects.
Malaysia’s arrangement raises interesting possibilities for constitutional designers. By requiring a special body comprised of subnational
representatives to consider certain amendments, constitutional designers
may be able to mitigate agency costs that sometimes dilute subnational
interests within the national legislature. And, by constitutionally establishing and organizing a special body, constitutional designers can also
control coordination problems between subnational units.
292
My review identified only two systems that included subnational units in this
way: Malaysia and Somalia. See Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia Aug.
27, 1957, ch. pt. XII, art. 159(5) [hereinafter Const. of Malay.]; Const. of Som. ch.
15, tit. 1, art. 132, § 5. (Amendment process triggers “joint committee” convened by
Somalian constitution).
293
See Const. of Malay., pt. XII, art. 159; see Abdul Aziz Bari & Farid Sufian
Shuaib, Constitution of Malaysia: Text and Commentary 336 (rev. ed. 2004)
(discussing restrictions on amendment process).
294
See Const. of Malaysia, pt. IV, ch. 2(38) (establishing and describing
Conference of Rulers).
295
The Conference has other duties besides review of constitutional
amendments, including selection of the monarch. The representatives for the nine
Malay states are the monarchic rulers from each state and the appointed governors
from the remaining four non-Malay states. See id.
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5. Inclusion of Subnational Units Through Initiation of Amendment
In general, most amendment rules require amendments to be initi296
297
ated by the national legislature, national executive, or popular initia298
tive. A few systems, however, allow subnational units to directly initiate
constitutional amendments. This is a rare inclusion device. My survey
identified only eight systems that authorize subnational units to initiate
299
national amendments in some way.
There is some variety in how subnational units can initiate amendments. In Brazil, a majority of the state legislatures can initiate an
300
amendment. The United States permits the states to initiate amend301
ments only by calling a Constitutional Convention. Interestingly, in
Moldova, amendments can be proposed by public initiative, but only if
“[c]itizens initiating the revision of the Constitution . . . cover at least a
half of the territorial-administrative units of the second level, and in each
of these units must be registered at least 20,000 signatures in support of
302
the said initiative.” This process seems aimed at ensuring that amendments brought by public initiative have widespread support within the
majority of subnational units. Italy also has an unusual process. Although
subnational units cannot truly initiate amendments, Italy’s Regional
Councils can intervene in the amendment process by requesting that a
proposed amendment already approved by the national legislature be
303
submitted to a national referendum for ratification. This process allows
the Regional Councils to operate collectively as a check on the national
legislature.
An important practical limitation on this approach is the difficulty of
304
coordinating amendment proposals between multiple states. Additionally, other than the United States, most systems require that the national
legislature or a national referendum ratify any amendments proposed by
296
See, e.g., S. Afr. Const., 1996 ch. 4, ,44. (“The national legislative authority as
vested in Parliament . . . confers on the National Assembly the power to . . . amend
the Constitution.”).
297
See, e.g., Const. of Iraq, § 6, art. 126 (1) (allowing the President in
conjunction with the Council of Ministers to propose amendments).
298
See, e.g., Const of Switz., tit. 4, ch. 2, art. 139 (“Any 100,000 persons eligible
to vote may . . . request a partial revision of the Federal Constitution.”).
299
Those systems are: Brazil, Ethiopia, Italy, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Russia,
Spain, and the United States of America.
300
See Const. of Braz., art. 60. Russia and Liechtenstein follow this approach as
well.
301
See U.S. Const. art. V.
302
See Constitutia Republicii Moldova July 29, 1994, tit. VI, art. 141, § 1(a).
303
See Costituzione art. 138 (It.).
304
See Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the
National Convention Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1511, 1527
(2010) (discussing coordination problems created by Article V’s convention
method).
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subnational communities. These limitations may explain why research
has not yet revealed a single amendment initiated by subnational units in
305
any of the systems that permit subnational initiation.
C. Non-Decentralization in Some Federal Systems
In addition to the decentralization mechanisms described above, my
review also identified a few “federal” systems that do not decentralize the
amendment power in any way. These systems constitutionally divide power between regional and central government, but they nevertheless con306
solidate the amendment power in national government institutions.
This procedure is understandable in unitary states without subnational
units. It is surprising, however, in federal systems with constitutionally
307
recognized subnational government. My survey of existing constitutional-amendment rules identified three expressly federal systems that do
308
not include subnational units in constitutional amendment in any way.
The Constitution of Venezuela, for example, describes Venezuela as
309
a “federal and decentralized State.” The constitution further describes
the Venezuelan states as “politically equal and autonomous organs with
310
full juridical personality.” Subnational communities separately elect
their state governors and legislatures, and states are required to adopt
311
their own subnational constitutions “to organize public authority.”
However, despite this federal structure, Venezuela’s amendment rules
effectively exclude subnational government. Amendment can be initiated
only by the President, a majority vote in the unicameral National Assem312
bly, or public initiative. Once an amendment is initiated, the proposal
305

Although the Constitution of the United States has not been amended
through the convention process, scholars have noted that the threat of a convention
has provided political pressure for Congress to approve certain amendments. See
generally Rogers, supra note 159 (discussing these instances).
306
See Lijphart, supra note 15, at 186–87 (providing general definition of
federalism).
307
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the dominant trend among federal systems
is to decentralize amendment power to some extent. My survey revealed that
approximately 22 of 25 federal systems include subnational constitutions in
constitutional amendment in some way.
308
These systems were Venezuela, the United Arab Emirates, and The Federation
of Saint Christopher and Nevis. All three of these systems constitutionally recognize
subnational government and expressly identify themselves as federal.
309
See Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela Dec. 20,
1999, pmbl.
310
See id. tit. IV, ch. III, art.159.
311
See id. tit. IV, ch. III, art. 164.
312
See id. tit. IX, ch. I, art. 341. The Venezuelan Constitution also provides
procedures for “Constitutional Reform,” which, unlike amendment, can alter the
“fundamental structure” of the Constitution. That procedure also excludes
subnational units. See id. tit. IX, ch. II, art 342–46.
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must be ratified by a nationwide public referendum. Thus, although
Venezuela constitutionally protects subnational government (and even
subnational constitutionalism), it does not include subnational officials
or communities in the national amendment process.
Albania provides another example. Albania’s constitution recognizes
314
“regions” as subsidiary subnational units of government. The regions
315
have elected Regional Councils that create policy for the region. Indeed, the “region is the unit where regional policies are made and im316
plemented and where they are harmonized with policies of the state.”
Notwithstanding this decentralization, Albania’s amendment rules effectively exclude subnational units because the national constitution can be
amended by the unicameral, proportionally elected National Assembly
317
and by a nationwide referendum.
From an institutional design perspective, there are various possible
explanations for why these systems exclude subnational units from constitutional amendment. First, constitutional systems with strong (perhaps
even authoritarian) executives have incentives to consolidate constitutional power at the center. Indeed, in many of these countries, subnational government is strictly controlled by the center in any event. Thus,
it is not surprising that their constitutional amendment rules consolidate
318
the amendment power at the center. Second, some non-authoritarian
systems decentralize authority primarily to ensure efficient delivery of
government services. Subnational government is primarily a tool for the
system, as a whole, to ensure efficient and effective delivery of govern319
ment services. These systems rely primarily on national institutions to
create policy, and this is reflected in their amendment rules as well.

313
314

Id. tit. IX, ch. II, art. 344.
See Kushtetuta e Republikës së Shqipërisë Nov. 28, 1998, pt. 6, art. 108(1)

(Alb.).
315

See id. pt. 6, art. 110(3).
See id. pt. 6, art. 110(2).
317
See id. pt. 17, art. 177, § 1–8.
318
This may explain systems like Albania, among others. In Albania, although the
Regions are constitutionally recognized, a national prefect oversees the Regions.
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Local and Regional Democracy in Albania, Doc.
No. CG(13)29, at II (Nov. 20, 2006), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.
jsp?id=1054079&Site=Congress. “[T]he prefect exists to ensure that the policy
approaches of the central government are followed at the local level. . . . The prefect
employs a number of staff who monitor the social, economic and political affairs of
the region. All policy documents and budgets are passed to the prefect who can hold
them for ten days to assess their legality.” Id. at III.
319
See, e.g., Constitucion Politica de Costa Rica Nov. 7, 1949, tit. VII, art. 168
(“To the effects of the Public Administration the national territory is divided into
provinces.”). Similarly, in Afghanistan, provincial legislatures are separately elected,
but the provinces exist expressly for administrative purposes.
316
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Although the dominant approach within federal systems is to decentralize the amendment power in some way, my study demonstrates that
not all federal arrangements need to decentralize the amendment power.
IV. AMENDMENT RATES AND DECENTRALIZING THE
AMENDMENT POWER
Recent empirical scholarship has shown that constitutional flexibility
320
is often important for constitutional endurance. In general, constitu321
tions are more likely to fail if they are either too rigid or too inflexible.
It is important therefore to consider how decentralizing the amendment
power might impact constitutional flexibility. One might expect, for example, that including subnational units in the amendment process would
result in more rigid constitutions, especially where subnational units can
322
veto amendments that would otherwise have been enacted. Including
subnational representatives in the national legislature could also retard
amendment rates if those representatives truly champion subnational in323
terests and the amendment rules require their approval. Thus, it is important to explore these issues so that constitutional designers understand the likely consequences of their design choices.
My taxonomy of decentralization mechanisms provides an opportunity to examine indicia of constitutional flexibility across the various
decentralization categories. This Part first describes the basic methodological limitations facing any comparative analysis of constitution flexibility. It then examines amendment rates across the various decentralization
mechanisms. I find that, on average, amendment rates are actually higher
in systems that require direct ratification by subnational units than in systems that do not decentralize the amendment power in any way. I also
find that, on average, amendment rates are highest in systems that require direct ratification by subnational units only on certain subjects.
A. Limitations on the Comparative Study of Amendability
Measuring the relative flexibility of a constitution is remarkably
324
complex. There is much debate among political scientists and legal

320

See Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 7–11, 94–103.
Id. at 82.
322
See supra notes 30 and 121 (discussing empirical and theoretical literature on
this point).
323
See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text (discussing how denominator
problem can frustrate constitutional amendment).
324
See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule
Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty,
13 Int. J. Const. L. 686, 687 (2015).
321
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325

scholars about the key determinants of constitutional flexibility. There
are at least three major areas of complexity in this regard.
First, it is very difficult to assess the relative difficulty of formal
amendment procedures on their face because they vary greatly across sys326
tems. The “steps to passage” of a constitutional amendment vary greatly, and it is hard to know which procedures are more difficult to satisfy
327
than others. For example, as Tom Ginsburg and James Melton have observed, “it is difficult to evaluate whether a constitution that requires a
two-thirds vote of the legislature to amend the constitution is more or less
flexible than one that requires an ordinary legislative majority with sub328
sequent referendum by the public.” Adding to the complexity is the
fact that many amendment procedures include alternative procedures
329
for amendment. In the Comoros, for example, amendments can be initiated by either the President or one-third of the members of the uni330
cameral national legislature. Once initiated, the amendment can be
approved by either two-thirds of the total membership of the national
legislature along with two-thirds of the subnational legislatures, or by a
331
national referendum. Additionally, many constitutions make certain
provisions or topics “unamendable” or provide different (sometimes
332
more arduous) procedures for different subjects. All of these variations
make it very difficult to assess the overall relative difficulty of formal
333
amendment procedures.
Despite these concerns, some scholars have looked to amendment
334
rates as a measure of constitutional flexibility. But counting amendments across constitutional systems presents its own difficulties. Sometimes amendments are adopted as a “package,” which can increase the
total number of constitutional amendments even though the system ex335
perienced only one true amendment “event.” The adoption of the Bill
325

See Dixon, supra note 44, at 96 (describing debate).
See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 690.
327
Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 690. But see Lutz, supra note 28, at 167–
68 (developing the index for estimating the relative difficulty of the amendment
process).
328
Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 690.
329
Id. at 691.
330
See Constitution of the Union of Comoros, 2001, tit. VIII, art. 42; see also
Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 691 (discussing Finland as an example of
alternative paths).
331
See Constitution of the Union of Comoros, 2001, tit. VIII art. 42.
332
See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 691.
333
But see Albert, supra note 22, at 913–14 (offering a sophisticated catalogue of
amendment categories that accounts for many of these variations).
334
See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 692–93 (explaining how scholars
have used amendment rates to measure constitutional flexibility).
335
This issue also arises when a constitutional law is adopted that makes a series
of changes to the text in order to achieve a singular change in the overall
326
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336

of Rights in the United States illustrates this. Some amendments are also adopted pro forma because they make relatively minor changes to the
text, which raises questions regarding whether they should be included
337
in the constitution’s true amendment “count.” Scholars have also noted
that, from a political perspective, once an amendment has been accepted, it is easier to get agreement regarding any subsequent amend338
ments. Thus, simply aggregating all amendments equally may not be a
reliable measure of constitutional flexibility. Amendment rates may also
339
fail to account for the availability of alternatives to formal amendment.
Some systems, such as the United States’, have accommodated the need
for constitutional change through informal processes such as judicial re340
view. Those alternative mechanisms for change presumably relieve
some of the “pressure” for formal amendment, and, consequently, may
341
affect a constitution’s amendment rate.
Finally, scholars have noted that constitutional flexibility is likely af342
fected by non-institutional factors such as political culture. Every society
seems to have a “set of attitudes about the desirability of amendment”
that is “independent of the substantive issues under consideration and
343
the degree of pressure for change.” Those attitudes create a “baseline
level of resistance to formal constitutional change” that affects amend-

constitutional system. See, e.g., S. Afr. Const., Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012
(making various textual changes to the constitution to effectuate the singular
purpose of re-organizing the judiciary).
336
See Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of Constitutionalism: The
Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 Widener J. Pub. L. 383, 396 (1993).
337
See Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 55–59; Law & Versteeg, supra note 41, at
n.87; Rasch & Congleton, supra note 29, at 333.
338
See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 694. This is because the “primary
difficulty in amending a constitution is finding a coalition willing to pass the
amendment.” Id. After the constitution is amended the first time, “such a coalition is
identified and subsequent amendments are easier to promulgate.” Id.
339
See id.
340
See Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of
National Emergency 17–31 (2006) (recounting how federal constitutional change
necessarily occurs through practical judicial decision-making because the federal
constitution is extremely hard to amend).
341
See Rasch & Congleton, supra note 29, at 338 (concluding that “the number of
formal changes to constitutional documents is a far from perfect measure of
constitutional stability”).
342
See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 697; Dixon, supra note 44, at 107
(“[T]he existing empirical literature makes clear that formal constitutional
amendment rules are far from an exclusive determinant of the rate of constitutional
amendment.”).
343
See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 697; Dixon, supra note 44, at 107
(“Popular attitudes toward a constitution . . . have a clear potential to influence the
practical difficulty of constitutional amendment.”).
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344

ment rates independent of the formal processes for amendment. This
may partially explain why systems such as that in Japan, which has a rela345
tively easy process for amendment, have never amended their constitutions, but other systems with similar amendment procedures have
346
amended their constitutions.
B. Amendment Rates in Countries with Decentralized Amendment Rules
Despite these limitations in measuring amendment rates across systems, scholars have developed meaningful quantitative models that com347
pare amendment activity across systems. The most recent and significant advancement in this regard is the work done by Zachary Elkin, Tom
Ginsburg, and James Melton in Constitutional Endurance. Constitutional
Endurance is an exhaustive study of almost all of the world’s constitu348
tions. Among other things, the authors found that there is a statistically
significant correlation between a constitution’s longevity and its suscepti349
bility to formal amendment. Within certain limits, a more static consti350
tution tends to increase the likelihood that a constitution will fail. Significantly for present purposes, the authors’ analysis includes a model for
351
estimating the ease of amending any given constitution. The model includes several variables designed to capture environmental factors relevant to amendment rates, such as the specificity of the constitution’s text,
ethnic heterogeneity, economic development, legacy of constitutional
352
endurance, democracy, and geographical location. In conjunction with
those variables, the model used information from both a constitution’s

344

See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 697.
See Nihonkoku Kenpō [Kenpō], ch. IX, art. 96 (Japan) (amendment initiated
by two-thirds vote of both houses in bicameral national legislature and ratified by
majority vote in national referendum).
346
Examples of countries with similar amendment procedures include: Peru (six
amendments since adoption in 1993), Albania (one amendment since adoption in
1998), and Paraguay (one amendment since adoption in 1992).
347
See Dixon, supra note 44, at 105 (summarizing various studies that have been
undertaken); Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 709 (listing and analyzing seven
studies of this kind).
348
See Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 8–10, 47–64.
349
See id. at 82–83, 99–101, 140. The authors found a non-linear relationship
between constitutional flexibility and endurance. Id. They found that the
“predominant effect of the variable is to decrease the odds of replacement as
flexibility increases,” but “extremely high values on flexibility are associated with an
increased risk of death.” Id. at 140.
350
Id. at 140–41.
351
See id. at 99–103.
352
See Elkins et al., Online Appendix for The Endurance of National Constitutions
(Nov. 3, 2009) (model included 56 total variables); Elkins et al., supra note 37, 225–
29.
345
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“observed amendment rate” and its “formal amendment procedures” to
353
calculate a predicted amendment rate per year that ranged from 0 to 1.
This amendment “index” provides a usable measure for comparing
constitutional flexibility across systems. Because I categorized all extant
national constitutions based on how they decentralize the amendment
power, I was able to cross-reference my designations with the amendment
rate index data from Constitutional Endurance. I was also able to crossreference my categorizations with raw amendment rate data from the
CCP. After making certain necessary adjustments, I was able to compare
amendment rates in decentralized systems with amendment rates in cen354
tralized systems.
For the amendment index data, the authors of Constitutional Endurance found that the mean amendment rate for all constitutions was 0.38
355
(with a standard deviation of 0.38). Using that amendment rate data
and information regarding constitutional life spans, they also concluded
that 0.54 appears to be the optimal amendment rate for constitutional
356
longevity.
As shown in Chart 1 below, I found that the average amendment rate
for systems that do not decentralize the amendment power in any way is
0.388, with a standard deviation of 0.342 (shown by the horizontal
357
line). Surprisingly, the average amendment rate for systems that require direct ratification of amendments by subnational units is slightly
358
higher at 0.394 (with a standard deviation of 0.433). Moreover, the
353
See id. at 101, 129; see Law & Versteeg, supra note 41, at 807 n.106 (explaining
that the index predicts a constitution’s chance of being amended in any given year).
Two of the variables included in the index are whether a constitution’s formal
amendment rules require “subsidiary units” or the “second chamber of the
legislature” to approve proposed amendments. See Elkins et al., supra note 37, at
225–29. Those variables overlap somewhat with my decentralization taxonomy, but
they do not appear to capture all of the decentralization nuances described in my
taxonomy.
354
My adjustments are explained infra in note 357.
355
Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 101.
356
Id. at 140.
357
The amendment index data available from Constitutional Endurance
covers all constitutions through 2005. Id. at 129. Thus, to ensure that I analyzed only
data for constitutions that I actually reviewed, I excluded from my analysis all
constitutions that were replaced between 2006 and April 2014 (when I completed my
review). I also confirmed that the amendment procedures for all surviving
constitutions had not been changed after 2005. This resulted in constitutions from
the following countries being removed from my sample: Angola, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Guinea, Hungary, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic,
Libya, Madagascar, Maldives, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Niger, Somalia, Syria,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, and Zimbabwe.
358
To conduct this comparison, I looked only at those systems that require
subnational units to directly ratify most constitutional amendments. I did not include
systems that require subnational ratification only on amendments that address certain
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amendment rate for systems that include subnational units only on issues
that relate to subnational interests was even higher at 0.453 (with a
359
standard deviation of 0.356). Thus, the average amendment rates for
those two decentralization categories were higher than the average
amendment rate for systems with a fully centralized amendment power.
This means that those systems are, on average, more likely to be amend360
ed in any given year than centralized systems. They are also slightly
361
closer to the optimal amendment rate of 0.54 than centralized systems.
Chart 1 also shows that the average amendment index for systems
that include subnational units in the amendment process only by providing them with representation in a unicameral national legislature is 0.308
(with a standard deviation of 0.371). Similarly, the average amendment

Amendment Index

Chart 1
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Average Amendment Rates Using Amendment
Index Data

Unicameral Only

Bicameral Only

Ratification

Subject Inclusion

Method of Decentralizing the Amendment Power
subjects. The following constitutions were therefore included: Australia, Canada,
Comoros, Ethiopia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nigeria, Palau, Russia, Switzerland, and
United States of America.
359
To conduct this comparison, I looked at those systems that require
subnational units to approve amendments only when those amendments relate to
certain subjects. I did not include systems that require subnational units to approve
amendments only when those amendments directly affect a particular subnational
unit. However, I did include Austria and South Africa because both of those systems
maintain a robust upper chamber in the national legislature that represents
subnational interests and the amendment rules require that body to approve any
amendments that relate to certain subjects affecting subnational interests. The
following constitutions were therefore included: Austria, India, Iraq, Kiribati,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.
360
See Law & Versteeg, supra note 41, at 807 n.106 (explaining amendment index
in this way).
361
See Elkins et al., supra note 37, at 140 (“Amendment flexibility appears to be
‘just right’ at about 0.54 on our flexibility scale.”).
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index for systems that include subnational units by providing them with
representation in a second legislative chamber was 0.299 (with a standard
deviation of 0.356). These averages are below the average for systems
with a centralized amendment power and even below the overall average
for all constitutions. This suggests that these systems are, on average,
slightly more rigid than centralized systems.
The results based on raw amendment rates are similar. Using data
from the CCP, I was able to calculate an annual amendment rate for each
362
constitution. I did this by dividing the number of amendments to a
363
constitution by the number of years that the constitution was in effect.
As shown in Chart 2 below, the average amendment rate for all systems
that do not decentralize the amendment power in any way is 0.137 (with
a standard deviation of 0.153) (shown again by the horizontal line). The
average amendment rate for systems that require direct ratification of
amendments by subnational units is again slightly higher at 0.15 (with a
364
standard deviation of 0.204). The average amendment rate for systems
that include subnational units only on issues that relate to subnational
interests was again even higher at 0.332 (with a standard deviation of
365
0.29). Finally, the amendment rates for systems that include subnational units only by providing representation in the national legislature were
slightly higher than the average for systems with a fully centralized
amendment power.

362
The CCP data provides this information for all constitutions through 2013.
However, I limited my analysis to constitutions through 2011 in order to avoid biasing
the results by including new constitutions that have not had any real opportunity to
undergo amendment. Thus, I removed the following six constitutions: Egypt, Fiji,
Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. Also, although the CCP data includes
information for all constitutions, including superseded constitutions, my analysis was
confined to extant national constitutions because that was the basis for my catalogue
of decentralization mechanisms.
363
See supra note 214 (describing CCP data). The CCP data records the initial
year that a constitution became effective as well as every year that it was amended
through the end of 2013. The CCP data does not record the number of actual
changes to a constitutional text that occur within any given year. By recording
amendments in this way, the data avoids counting problems associated with
“bundled” amendments. For example, for the United States Constitution, the data
shows only one amendment event in 1791 when the states ratified all ten
amendments comprising the Bill of Rights. This is not a limitation on the data,
however, because, as noted above, amendments are often adopted in packages. The
better measure of constitutional change is whether a constitution was amended in a
given year and not the total number of textual amendments.
364
This includes the same systems that I analyzed using the amendment index
data. See supra note 358.
365
This includes the same systems that I analyzed using the amendment index
data. See supra note 359.
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Chart 2
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There are many limitations on my preliminary analysis of these data.
As mentioned above, measuring constitutional flexibility is difficult at
best and methodologically impossible at worst. Neither the amendment
rate index nor the annual amendment rate that I use above are perfect
indicators of constitutional flexibility. Moreover, my comparison of averages across categories does not account for the myriad variables that
might explain amendment rates, and my decentralization categories
generally involve small sample sizes. Any attempt to show a causal relationship between my decentralization categories and constitutional flexibility would require a more sophisticated quantitative model that accounts for numerous variables (some of which scholars are only just
366
beginning to discover). Thus, it is not my purpose here to defend any
causal relationships. I hope instead to draw attention to various plausible
causal hypotheses suggested by my analysis that should be investigated
with more rigorous empirical methods as scholars learn more about how
to analyze constitutional flexibility.
The first hypothesis suggested by my findings is that decentralizing
the amendment power by requiring subnational government to ratify all
(or most) proposed amendments may not frustrate constitutional flexibility. This is somewhat surprising because this method of decentralizing
the amendment may be the most effective at reducing agency costs that
366

See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 324, at 697.
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367

undermine subnational interests. In other words, it appears that the
most effective decentralization mechanism might not compromise constitutional flexibility. If true, this could be an important discovery for constitutional designers wrestling with how best to divide the amendment
power between levels of government.
This hypothesis gains some tangential support from early empirical
studies examining smaller constitutional samples. In 1997, John Ferejohn
developed a model to analyze amendment data from thirty constitutional
368
republics. He found that “[t]here is no evidence that a ratification requirement . . . involving states . . . has any significant impact on amend369
ment rates.” Instead, Ferejohn found that national “legislative complexity—the requirement of special majorities or separate majorities in
different legislative sessions or bicamerality—is the key variable explain370
ing amendment rates . . . .” A separate 2006 study of nineteen countries
did not find any unique effect on amendment rates associated with a re371
quirement for ratification by subnational government. The study also
found that super-majority requirements in the legislature do not seem to
372
affect amendment rates. Rather, “the salient factor seems to be multi373
ple decisions with voter involvement.” These findings are far from conclusive, but they nevertheless provide some tangential support for my
374
findings here and set the stage for further inquiries of this kind.

367

See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing agency problems when subnational units are
represented only by inclusion in the national legislature).
368
See Ferejohn, supra note 44, at 523 (analyzing data from thirty constitutional
republics).
369
Id.
370
See Ferejohn, supra note 44, at 523; see also Dixon, supra note 44, at 105
(“Ferejohn found no evidence that any form of ratification requirement affected the
rate of amendment: the only factors he found to be statistically significance were
super- and double-majority requirements for legislative passage of proposed
amendments, and legislative bicameralism.”).
371
See Rasch & Congleton, supra note 29, at 333.
372
See id.
373
See id. at 334.
374
A more recent 2012 study of only federal countries used the same data from
Constitutional Endurance to examine constitutional fatality in federal countries. See
John Kincaid, The Relevance of Constitutional Change in Federal Systems, in Changing
Federal Constitutions, supra note 193, at 31, 33–34. The study found that although
the overall median lifespan of all federal constitutions was relatively low (11 years),
the median lifespan of extant federal constitutions was relatively high (30 years).
Because the median lifespan of all current national constitutions is 25 years, these
results suggest relative longevity for extant federal constitutions. Id. Twenty-two of the
twenty-five federal systems analyzed in this follow-up study included subnational units
in national constitutional change in some form. Using federalism as a proxy, this
study seems to support the possibility that decentralization of amendment power does
not necessarily correlate to reduced constitutional lifespans.
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The second hypothesis suggested by my findings is less surprising but
no less significant for the study of constitutional design. My findings suggest that decentralizing the amendment power by requiring subnational
units to ratify amendments only if the proposals affect subnational interests has even less effect on constitutional flexibility. My review identified
ten countries that give subnational units significant power in the
amendment process when the proposed amendments affect subnational
375
interests. These systems otherwise do not decentralize the amendment
power in any meaningful way. Amendment rates in these countries are,
on average, higher than any other decentralization category and significantly higher than systems with centralized amendment procedures. Indeed, these systems were, on average, very close to the optimal amendment rate index identified in Constitutional Endurance.
If validated, these findings suggest that carefully selecting the subjects
that trigger subnational involvement may be an effective way to decentralize the amendment power without compromising constitutional flexibility. This design has the benefit of including subnational interests in
the amendment process on issues where subnational communities may
provide meaningful input and where they may have real interests at stake.
Thus, without compromising constitutional flexibility, it provides a relevant check on national institutions vested with the amendment power
and relevant diversification of voice in the amendment process. It may also help foster political legitimacy by ensuring that subnational units do
not have disproportionate power to veto amendments, but nevertheless
guarantee that their interests will not be affected without their direct involvement. In many respects, this decentralization mechanism provides
an opportunity for constitutional designers to have the best of both
worlds.
In all, further investigation is necessary to precisely determine the
impact (if any) of decentralizing the amendment power. However, the
analysis here draws attention to the significance of future inquiries into
these issues and provides a starting point for framing those inquires.
CONCLUSION
As our knowledge of constitutional change grows, it is important that we
continue to investigate how constitutional designers can best structure
the amendment power. This Article provides the first detailed taxonomy
of decentralization devices and identifies the various reasons why decentralizing the amendment power might be desirable. This Article also exposes some interesting correlations between decentralization of constitutional amendment power and constitutional amendment rates. These
preliminary findings suggest that decentralizing the amendment power

375

See supra note 359 (explaining and listing these ten systems).
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may not necessarily frustrate constitutional flexibility. There is much to
be done to fully understand the amendment power, but this Article aims
to make a small contribution to our understanding of this important constitutional issue and hopefully provide constitution makers and scholars
with some insight into the intelligent design of amendment rules.
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APPENDIX A
List of All Constitutions Reviewed and Year of Adoption
Country
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Costa Rica
Cote D’Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus

Year of Constitution
2004
1998
1963
1993
2010
1981
1983
1995
1901
1945
1995
1973
2002
1986
1966
1994
1831
1981
1990
2008
2009
1995
1966
1988
1959
1991
1991
2005
1993
1972
1867
1980
2004
1996
1980
1982
1991
2001
2001
1949
2000
1991
1976
1960
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Country
Czech Republic
Democratic Republic of Congo
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
East Timor
Ecuador
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
German Federal Republic
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Kosovo
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Laos

Year of Constitution
1993
2005
1953
1992
1978
2010
2002
2008
1983
1991
1997
1992
1994
2013
1999
1958
1991
1996
1995
1949
1992
1975
1991
1985
2010
1984
1980
1987
1982
2011
1944
1949
1959
1979
2005
1937
1958
1947
1962
1946
1952
1995
2010
1979
2008
1992
2010
1991
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Country
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
Monaco
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
People’s Republic of Korea
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Republic of Korea

[Vol. 19:4

Year of Constitution
1991
1926
1993
1986
2011
1921
1992
1868
1991
2010
1994
1957
2008
1992
1964
1979
1991
1968
1917
1981
1994
1962
1992
2007
2011
2004
2008
1990
1968
2006
1815
1987
2010
1999
1814
1996
2002
1981
1972
1975
1992
1972
1993
1987
1997
1976
2003
1948
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DECENTRALIZING THE AMENDMENT POWER
Country
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Somalia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
South Sudan
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United States of America
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela

Year of Constitution
1991
1993
2003
1962
1975
1992
2001
2006
1993
1996
1959
1992
1991
1992
2012
1978
1996
2011
1978
1978
1983
1978
1979
2005
1987
2005
1974
1999
2012
1947
1994
1977
2007
1992
1875
1976
2014
1982
2008
1986
1995
1996
1971
1789
1985
1992
1980
1999
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Country
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe

[Vol. 19:4

Year of Constitution
1991
1991
2013
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